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5 
Issues and Conclusions 
Mobilising Trade Policy for Climate Action  
under the Paris Agreement: 
Options for the European Union 
The European Union (EU) has been advocating climate 
policy ambitions from the very beginning of the inter-
national climate regime. In 2015, when the Paris Agree-
ment was adopted, the EU helped to pave the way for 
a new universal regime, which includes actions by 
parties to the agreement, be they industrialised or 
developing countries. Climate action, however, needs 
support across nearly all fields of national and inter-
national policy-making. Nations that embark on, or 
intensify, an agenda to reduce emissions will not act 
in isolation. Also, emitters, such as companies, often 
compete on international markets. Therefore, climate 
policy measures can have trade implications. This is 
why the international trade regime – including the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) and a large number 
of regional trade agreements (RTAs) – plays an increas-
ingly important role for the implementation of the 
Paris Agreement. 
In this research paper, we ask how trade policy 
could be made more supportive of climate action and 
discuss the relationship between the regimes estab-
lished by the WTO and the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the pro-
visions and pending disputes under the WTO, and the 
role of RTAs. We look into the features of the Paris 
Agreement that relate to trade and highlight several 
options for how policy-makers in the EU and else-
where could address the relationship between the two 
regimes from a legal and institutional perspective. In 
particular, the suggested options relate to fields where 
the EU has taken climate action in recent years and 
which are part of the 188 intended nationally deter-
mined contributions (INDCs) submitted in the run-up 
to the Paris Agreement. 
The international trade policy landscape has be-
come increasingly fragmented. More regional agree-
ments have led to a diminishing role for the WTO. At 
the same time, however, the WTO dispute settlement 
system has to decide on an increasing number of cases 
that indirectly connect to national climate policies, 
in particular national measures to promote renewable 
energy production that impact trade partners in an 
unfavourable way. These seemingly contradictory ob-
servations matter for the implementation of the Paris 
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Agreement. First, many RTAs include climate-related 
and environmental provisions (e.g. the North Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement, NAFTA), and could thus 
help prevent a regulatory race to the bottom and 
promote climate protection. Second, the increasing 
number of WTO disputes over national renewable 
energy policy regulations points to the case-by-case 
nature of WTO rule application on the one hand, and 
to a more systemic conflict of national approaches 
with the WTO obligation of non-discrimination on 
the other. 
Against this background, the EU, which is a tradi-
tional supporter of the multilateral trading system, 
has to consider how to make its climate policy agenda 
consistent with trade ambitions. Promising ways for 
lowering emissions fast are to disseminate climate-
friendly technologies, to export the EU climate govern-
ance approach including policy instruments, and to 
incentivise low-carbon investments through carbon 
pricing. The European Commission and the EU Mem-
ber States should integrate into their thinking how 
trade policy could promote these steps. Trade policy is 
one of the key mandates of the EU, but it has become 
subject to immense public and political pressure dur-
ing the last years. As a reaction to the fierce protest 
against the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Part-
nership (TTIP) negotiations, in 2015 the European 
Commission suggested a “Trade for All” strategy, 
which aims at promoting transparency, sustainable 
development, and human rights as key aspects when 
negotiating new trade agreements. This strategy can 
help build trust in the EU trade agenda and promote 
environmental standards in trade talks, but it needs 
to go beyond a political declaration and receive more 
and explicit support from the EU Member States. 
The EU has actively taken part in the negotiations 
on an Environmental Goods Agreement (EGA) with 16 
other WTO members. The EGA talks under the WTO 
need another diplomatic push following a breakdown 
in December 2016 due to a stalemate between the EU 
and China. Also, there have been a number of conflicts 
around solar panels and steel trade with China. Yet, 
EU-China cooperation is key to ensure the success of 
the Paris Agreement at a time when the current US 
administration is turning its back on both the climate 
treaty and free trade. Not only the EGA, but also co-
operation on climate policies and on technology could 
help make this partnership more fruitful. 
As a longer-term vision, the EU should insist on the 
role of the WTO and its rules-based multilateral sys-
tem, also in addressing climate change. The global 
regime needs to give guidance on what is unaccep-
table protectionism and what are legitimate climate 
policy targets. Among the legal options, the introduc-
tion of an authoritative interpretation of the excep-
tion rules of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) could clarify the scope of exceptions to 
trade obligations in the longer term. Also, the dispute 
settlement mechanism under the WTO could increase 
competence by including climate-related expertise. 
In the medium term, negotiations of RTAs are a 
way forward for developing cooperation on rules on 
climate and trade with key EU partner countries. With 
an expansive scope that covers not only market access, 
but also regulatory coherence, RTAs can pave the way 
for supporting national climate policies through trade 
cooperation. Mega-regional trade deals (such as TTIP, 
or the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agree-
ment, CETA) have the potential to diffuse climate pro-
tection rules more widely as long as the negotiating 
parties have a common interest in avoiding a race to 
the bottom in setting climate policy standards. Al-
though prospects for a common EU-US agenda are low 
with the current Trump administration, this strategy 
could be resumed with other partners, including China, 
Japan, Australia, or India. The EU could further start 
a review process of existing trade agreements, in par-
ticular those with developing countries. 
In the short term, the EU and its Member States 
should push for more transparency at the international 
level between the bodies of the WTO and the UNFCCC. 
To achieve this, an extended institutional setting at the 
WTO, for example through a Committee on Trade, En-
vironment and Climate Change, would be one option. 
Another option would be to encourage increased co-
ordination of existing bodies at the WTO (e.g. the Com-
mittee on Trade and Environment (CTE), and the Trade 
Policy Review Mechanism) and at the UNFCCC (e.g. 
the Subsidiary Body on Scientific and Technological 
Advice, and the improved forum on the impact of the 
implementation of response measures), with the aim 
of regular and detailed exchanges of information on 
the implementation of nationally determined con-
tributions (NDCs). 
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The Climate and Trade Regimes 
 
The interactions between the climate regime and the 
trade regime have been increasing over the last three 
decades. The separation between trade and environment 
as unconnected policy fields has become diluted since 
the 1990s, due to pioneering regional trade agreements 
(RTAs) including environmental provisions such as the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), as well 
as due to World Trade Organization (WTO) case law on 
trade measures that were taken to protect the environ-
ment. 
Figure 1 illustrates the trade and climate regimes 
and their commonalities. In particular, both are con-
nected by political initiatives such as the negotiation 
of an Environmental Goods Agreement (EGA), pushed 
first by the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 
nations and then by the European Union (EU), under the 
WTO, or by the nationally determined contributions 
(NDCs) now part of the post-2020 Paris climate regime. 
Increasingly, the rules and norms of the regimes relate 
to each other, determining how climate actions by WTO 
members can be made compatible with WTO rules, or, 
vice versa, how WTO rules could help design climate 
policies in the international context. Last but not 
least, institutions and processes overlap to an increas-
ing degree, for example in the negotiations among 
parties to the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the WTO, or both. 
The EU has been advocating climate policy ambi-
tions from the very beginning of the international cli-
mate regime. In 2015, when the Paris Agreement was 
adopted, the EU helped to pave the way for a new uni-
versal regime. For the EU and for all other countries 
with climate targets, performance will depend in par-
ticular on the integration of climate policy-making in 
a variety of other policy fields, including trade policy. 
Trade liberalisation can, on the one hand, foster the 
fast uptake of climate-friendly goods and services and 
foster the deployment of clean technologies. Countries 
following-up on their NDCs will need access to these 
technologies, which not only relate to energy effi-
ciency or renewable energy production, but also to 
reducing all harmful greenhouse gases across the 
economy. On the other hand, national climate policy 
measures can collide with trade rules due to conflict-
ing principles and priorities, for example on protec-
tionism. As such, these rules need to be discussed and 
evaluated with a view to their potential of supporting 
climate policy without compromising trade. 
The political climate in the EU and the United 
States (US), however, has changed considerably since 
the entry into force of the Paris Agreement on 4 No-
vember 2016. With President Donald Trump in office, 
both US climate protection and open trade have come 
under pressure from the “America First” approach. 
This may have severe ramifications for the implemen-
tation of international climate policy,1 with deregula-
tion emerging as a key prong of the new administra-
tion’s policies, and the notified intention to withdraw 
from the Paris Agreement. There are also significant 
implications for trade policy, with the new president 
withdrawing from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) 
on his fourth day in office. This poses new challenges 
for trade-and-climate policy interactions. For instance, 
the Mexican under-secretary for environmental policy 
and planning contemplated publicly about imposing 
a carbon tariff against the US.2 In addition, the EU was 
facing major internal conflicts about the negotiations 
of transatlantic trade deals already before the 2016 US 
elections. The Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement (CETA) with Canada was at the brink of 
failing to secure approval from the Wallonian parlia-
ment in Belgium in late 2016,3 and the Transatlantic  
 
1 Susanne Dröge, International Climate Diplomacy after the Trump 
Election Victory. Germany and the EU Should Intensify Their Outreach 
to Climate Allies, SWP Comments 50/2016 (Berlin: Stiftung Wis-
senschaft und Politik, November 2016). 
2 See Coral Davenport, “Diplomats Confront New Threat to 
Paris Climate Pact: Donald Trump”, New York Times, 18 Novem-
ber 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/19/us/politics/ 
trump-climate-change.html?_r=1 (accessed 8 December 2017). 
3 The national and some regional governments had to ap-
prove CETA because it was proposed as a “mixed agreement” 
by the European Commission. See European Commission, 
“European Commission Proposes Signature and Conclusion 
of EU-Canada Trade Deal”, 5 July 2016, http://europa.eu/rapid/ 
press-release_IP-16-2371_en.htm (accessed 8 December 2017). 
The EU and Canada signed the agreement, only after a late 
veto of the local government of Wallonia, Belgium, could 
be averted, see “If the EU Cannot Do Trade, What Can It Do?”, 
The Economist, 29 September 2016. In February 2016, CETA was 
approved by the European Parliament (408 votes in favour, 
254 against, and 33 abstentions).  
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Figure 1 
Overview – The interactions between the trade and the climate regime 
Source: Own presentation. 
 
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) with the US 
had become the subject of public protests and political 
interventions by EU Member States. The exclusive 
EU competence on trade relations (see Box), which 
was deepened under the 2009 Lisbon Treaty, has been 
brought into questioned by these conflicts around 
mega-regional agreements, adding political complex-
ity.4 In particular, the public protests addressed invest-
ment rules, which the EU can negotiate, according to 
the Lisbon Treaty, for all Member States, and which 
the European Parliament can either agree to or veto.5 
 
4 The European Commission claimed exclusive competency 
on CETA, in line with EU treaties. France, Germany and other 
member state leaders in the European Council insisted that 
the European Commission proposed CETA as a mixed agree-
ment. The European Court of Justice still could evaluate this 
in the near future. See “CETA to Be Concluded As a Mixed 
Agreement; Commission Hopes for Signing in October” 
(Winnipeg: International Institute for Sustainable Develop-
ment [IISD], 10 August 2016), https://www.iisd.org/itn/2016/ 
08/10/ceta-to-be-concluded-as-a-mixed-agreement-commission-
hopes-for-signing-in-october/ (accessed 8 December 2017). 
5 The European Commission suggests a “Trade for All” strat-
egy as a way forward. It shall retaliate the push for free trade 
with EU partners in ongoing talks (China, Japan, or the US) 
With the increasing importance of national meas-
ures following the adoption of the Paris Agreement, 
synergies and conflicts between the two policy fields 
can be expected to change further, and faster. A key 
indicator in this regard are the WTO disputes that 
have emerged in recent years, centring on renewable 
energy production and trade in related goods and 
services. The inclusion of environmental and climate 
policy provisions in RTAs, starting with NAFTA, fur-
ther shows that there is a demand for policy coordina-
tion. In light of the changing political environment, 
the appetite for such coordination seems to be waning 
in the Western hemisphere. However, given the role of 
trade in the faster dissemination of technologies and 
regulatory approaches, big players such as the EU and 
China will need to strengthen their trade policies in 
this respect, for example by negotiating improved 
market access with key partner countries. 
 
with demands for transparency, sustainable development 
and social standards. European Commission, “Trade for All – 
Towards a More Responsible Trade and Investment Policy”, 
2015, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/october/ 
tradoc_153846.pdf (accessed 8 December 2017). 
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Box 
The European Union’s exclusive competence on trade 
The “exclusive competence” (Article 3 Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union, TFEU) of the 
EU in trade issues (Articles 206, 207 TFEU) has been 
challenged in the course of CETA and TTIP approv-
als. With regards to these mega-regional agree-
ments, EU Member States argued that they should 
be categorised as “mixed agreements”. According to 
EU law, agreements with a mixed character need to 
be ratified by the domestic ratification procedures 
of EU Member States.a During the negotiations of 
both CETA and TTIP, legal distinctions of the cat-
egories were uncertain. 
In the case of CETA, national and some regional 
governments had to approve the agreement. The  
 In May 2017, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
issued its highly anticipated opinion on a proce-
dure regarding the exclusive competence. The 
request for an opinion by the ECJ was initiated by 
the European Commission and aimed at clarifying 
the distinction between exclusive and shared com-
petences in the EU-Singapore trade agreement, 
which emerged during the adoption of this agree-
ment in 2014. Although the ECJ ruling deals with 
this particular agreement, its result is interpreted 
as a clarification of the EU treaties in general.e 
Therefore, the following allocation of areas to dif-
ferent forms of competences by the ECJ will shape 
future trade negotiations: 
European Commission planned to claim exclusive 
competence on CETA beforehand.b This is a proce-
dure without veto power for the Member States. 
However, France, Germany, and other Member State 
leaders in the European Council insisted that CETA 
should be categorised as a “mixed agreement”.c Due 
to the political resistance of the Member States and 
the legal uncertainty, the European Commission 
then proposed to sign CETA as a mixed agreement.d 
The EU and Canada could only sign the agreement 
after an intense political struggle, including a late 
veto by the local government of Wallonia, Belgium, 
In February 2016, CETA was approved by the Europe-
an Parliament (408 votes in favour, 254 against, and 
33 abstentions). 
 Exclusive competence has been identified regard-
ing goods and services market access (including 
transport), public procurement, energy generation 
from sustainable non-fossil sources, direct foreign 
investment protections, intellectual property rights, 
competition rules, sustainable development, and 
exchange of information in areas that involve 
notification, verification, cooperation, mediation, 
transparency, and disputes. Shared competence, 
which requires national consent, has been identi-
fied for non-direct foreign investments as well as 
the regime governing “dispute settlement between 
investors and States”.f 
a See European Parliament, A Guide to EU Procedures for the 
Conclusion of International Trade Agreements, October 2016, http:// 
www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/593489/ 
EPRS_BRI(2016)593489_EN.pdf (accessed 8 December 2017). 
b See “EU Commission to Opt for Simple Approval for Cana-
da Deal: EU Official”, Reuters, 28 June 2017, http://www. 
reuters.com/article/us-eu-canada-trade/eu-commission-to-opt-
for-simple-approval-for-canada-deal-eu-official-idUSKCN0ZE2 
BG (accessed 8 December 2017). 
c European Parliament Research Service, Is CETA a Mixed 
Agreement?, 1 July 2017, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ 
RegData/etudes/ATAG/2016/586597/EPRS_ATA(2016)586597_ 
EN.pdf. 
d “European Commission Proposes Signature and Conclu-
sion of EU-Canada Trade Deal”, European Commission, 5 July 
2016, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/ 
2016/586597/EPRS_ATA(2016)586597_EN.pdf (accessed 8 De-
cember 2017). 
 e See International Center for Trade and Sustainable 
Development (ICTSD), “European Court of Justice Rules on EU 
Competence in Singapore Trade Deal”, BRIDGES (18 May 2017), 
https://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges/news/european-
court-of-justice-rules-on-eu-competence-in-singapore-trade-deal 
(accessed 8 December 2017). 
f Court of Justice of the European Union, “The Free Trade 
Agreement with Singapore Cannot, in Its Current Form, 
Be Concluded by the EU Alone”, Press Release no. 52/17, 
https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/ 
2017-05/cp170052en.pdf (accessed 8 December 2017). 
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The Climate Regime – from the UN Frame-
work Convention to the Paris Agreement 
The UNFCCC was adopted in 1992 at the Rio Confer-
ence on Environment and Development. With 196 par-
ties, it has nearly universal participation. It sets out 
the main objective of the climate regime as “stabili-
zation of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmos-
phere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthro-
pogenic interference with the climate system”.6 How-
ever, the UNFCCC did not specify the legal obligations 
to achieve this objective, and thus parties started nego-
tiating a protocol to stipulate mitigation targets for 
developed countries. This led to the adoption of the 
Kyoto Protocol in 1997, which now has 192 parties. 
The Protocol required industrialised countries to col-
lectively reduce average greenhouse gas emissions by 
5.2 per cent during the 2008–2012 period (i.e. the first 
commitment period), compared to 1990 levels. As an 
innovation, it introduced several market-based instru-
ments (“flexible mechanisms”) to allow for cost-effec-
tive mitigation. Although developing countries have 
signed and ratified the Kyoto Protocol, they do not 
have any concrete obligations to reduce their emis-
sions. With the 2012 Doha Amendment to the Kyoto 
Protocol, parties agreed on a new commitment period 
for 2013–2020.7 
The Paris Agreement was adopted by the 195 parties 
to the UNFCCC on 12 December 2015 and has been rati-
fied by 174 states (January 2018).8 It entered into force 
on 4 November 2016. Its purpose is: (1) to limit the 
global average temperature increase to “well below” 
2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels and “to 
pursue efforts” to achieve 1.5 degrees Celsius; (2) to 
enhance the ability to adapt to climate change, to in-
crease the resilience, and to develop mechanisms to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions; (3) to make financial 
flows consistent with a low-emissions pathway and 
climate-resilient development. Unlike the Kyoto Proto-
col, the core obligations under the Paris Agreement 
apply universally to all UNFCCC parties, and not just 
 
6 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) (1992), https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/ 
conveng.pdf (accessed 8 December 2017). 
7 By November 2017, 84 states had ratified the Doha Amend-
ment; 144 out of 192 (3/4) are needed, https://treaties.un.org/ 
Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-7-c& 
chapter=27&clang=_en#EndDec (accessed 8 December 2017). 
8 http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9444.php (as of 
8 February 2018). 
developed-country parties.9 The Paris Agreement 
requires all parties to prepare and communicate 
NDCs, which will have to be reviewed and updated 
every five years, with each new NDC required to be 
more ambitious than the previous one.10 The 
Agreement further specifies actions in the area of 
adaptation, as well as obligations related to the 
“means of implementation” (i.e. financial, technologi-
cal, and capacity-building support). 
The UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol both include 
explicit references to trade-policy concerns. The lan-
guage used is partly identical to that found in the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),11 aiming 
at preventing protectionist applications of climate 
policy measures. The Paris Agreement, by contrast, 
does not contain any references to trade, due mainly 
to the diverging positions of developed and develop-
ing countries.12 
In order to offer institutional space for discussing 
such critical issues, parties to the UNFCCC created 
a forum on the impact of the implementation of re-
sponse measures in 2010.13 The work of the forum 
was required to take into account “all relevant policy 
issues of concern”.14 Although its work programme 
does not directly tackle the climate–trade overlap, 
technical work on assessing the impacts of response 
 
9 UNFCCC, Paris Agreement, 2015, https://unfccc.int/resource/ 
docs/2015/cop21/eng/l09.pdf (accessed 8 December 2017). For 
an overview of the new regime, see Susanne Dröge, The Paris 
Agreement: Turning Point for the International Climate Regime, SWP 
Research Paper 4/2016 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Politik, February 2016). 
10 In 2015, parties to the UNFCCC have submitted their 
INDCs, which will have to be updated and turned into NDCs 
under the Paris Agreement. 
11 Article 3.5 UNFCCC (1992) states that climate policy meas-
ures should not “constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifi-
able discrimination or a disguised restriction on international 
trade”. 
12 Harro van Asselt, Fragmentation of Global Climate Governance. 
Consequences and Management of Regime Interactions (Cheltenham, 
UK, and Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2014); Nicholas 
Chan, “The ‘New’ Impacts of the Implementation of Climate 
Change Response Measures”, Review of European, Comparative 
and International Environmental Law 25, no. 2 (2016). 
13 UNFCCC, Decision 1/CP.16, 2015, 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2010/cop16/eng/07a01.pdf 
(accessed 8 December 2017). UNFCCC, Paris Agreement, Article 
4.15 (see note 12); Chan, “The ‘New’ Impacts of the Implemen-
tation of Climate Change Response Measures” (see note 12). 
The forum is now called the “improved forum”. 
14 UNFCCC, Decision 1/CP.21, para. 6, 2015, https://unfccc.int/ 
resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/10a01.pdf (accessed 8 Decem-
ber 2017). 
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measures suggests that trade-related impacts are being 
considered.15 In particular, the UNFCCC guidance on 
the impact assessment of response measures on devel-
oping countries mentions trade impacts from tariffs 
and border carbon adjustments (BCAs).16 
With the adoption of the Paris Agreement, the cli-
mate regime has witnessed an evolution towards a 
universal regime that requires mitigation efforts from 
all parties, but leaves open what kind of action parties 
undertake. The shift towards a more “bottom-up” ap-
proach to international climate policy holds potential 
implications for trade, as the resulting flexibility al-
lows for a variety of measures that could have trade 
implications, and for which a supportive trade policy 
setting would be helpful. 
The World Trade Regime and Its Interactions 
with the Climate Regime 
The international trade regime has also undergone 
important changes in recent years. Although a well-
established system of trade rules has been in place for 
more than 20 years, and WTO members now include 
the world’s major trading nations, the single under-
taking approach that led to the WTO in the first place 
has created difficulties. Flanked by an increasing num-
ber of RTAs – and, more recently, new mega-regional 
agreements – the relevance and dominance of the 
WTO in setting international trade rules has been 
challenged. This, in turn, may offer both opportunities 
and risks for global climate protection, because there 
is a lack of guidance on the one hand, and space for 
new mutually supportive rules on the other. 
The World Trade Organization 
The origins of the world trade regime date back to 
1947, when the GATT was adopted. The WTO was 
established in 1995, following the conclusion of the 
Uruguay Round of trade negotiations (1986–1994). 
The WTO, which had 164 members in 2017, is the 
 
15 For the work programme, see http://unfccc.int/ 
cooperation_support/response_measures/items/7418.php 
(accessed 8 December 2017). 
16 UNFCCC, Guidance to Assist Developing Country Parties to Assess 
the Impact of the Implementation of Response Measures, Including 
Guidance on Modelling Tools, Section III, A 36 (e), p. 8, 2016, 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2016/tp/04.pdf (accessed 8 De-
cember 2017). 
institutional umbrella of a series of six sub-categories 
of agreements, including 14 agreements on trade in 
goods (e.g. GATT), and five other types of agreements, 
such as the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS) and the Agreement on Trade-related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).17 
The key objective of the GATT was to promote the 
liberalisation of trade in goods for the benefit of its 
members. It sets out a number of trade principles, 
most notably that trade measures imposed by a mem-
ber shall not discriminate between different trade 
partners (known as the most-favoured nation (MFN) 
obligation; Article I).18 Neither shall they discriminate 
against imported goods from other members vis-à-vis 
“like” domestic goods (the national treatment obli-
gation; Article III). 
Although initial rounds of trade talks under the 
GATT were devoted to bringing down tariffs, later 
negotiation rounds (starting with the Tokyo Round, 
1973–1979) broadened the scope to non-tariff barriers, 
such as import licensing, rules of origin, and invest-
ment measures. Over time, the multilateral trade re-
gime came to cover new areas, such as services (through 
the GATS), intellectual property rights (through the 
TRIPS Agreement), technical standards (through the 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, TBT), and 
subsidies (through the Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures, SCM). 
An important feature of the WTO is its strong 
dispute settlement mechanism, which extends the 
GATT’s practice.19 The same dispute settlement rules 
apply to disputes under virtually all WTO agreements, 
subject to any special or additional rules in an individ-
ual agreement.20 Yet, the politically desirable outcome 
of a dispute is a resolution of the conflict through 
consultations, or, more generally, a solution mutually 
acceptable to the parties to the dispute. If this is not 
possible, the primary objective of the process is to with-
draw the measure under contention, with compen-
 
17 WTO, Agreement on Establishing the WTO, 1995, https://www. 
wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/04-wto.pdf (accessed 8 Decem-
ber 2017). 
18 More specifically, a WTO member is obliged to provide to 
another WTO member treatment that is “no less favourable” 
than what it accords to any other country, irrespective of 
whether that country is a WTO member. 
19 WTO, Agreement on Establishing the WTO (see note 17), 
Article III. 
20 The WTO’s dispute settlement understanding (DSU) speci-
fies the scope of jurisdiction of the WTO dispute settlement 
mechanism, limiting it to the “covered agreements” listed in 
Article 1.1 DSU. 
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sation and retaliation being avenues of last resort.21 In 
contrast to the GATT’s diplomatic norms, which were 
criticised for lacking the “teeth” necessary to ensure 
compliance, the dispute settlement mechanism has 
been described as being “the most developed dispute 
settlement system in any existing treaty regime”.22 
This is reflected in a total of 500 disputes over the 
20-year history of the WTO, which strongly contrasts 
with the total of 300 disputes brought under the dis-
pute settlement system of the GATT – the predecessor 
to the WTO – over a period of 47 years (1947–1994).23 
In 2001, a new round of trade talks – the Doha 
Development Round – was launched to expressly 
address issues of importance to developing countries. 
The Doha Round includes negotiations on the reduc-
tion or elimination of tariffs and non-tariff barriers 
on environmental goods and services. Like previous 
rounds, the Doha Round negotiations follow a single 
undertaking approach, in which countries agree on all 
issues together. This prevents countries from cherry-
picking issues, but it makes consensus more challeng-
ing. The Doha Round largely came to a halt in 2008, 
and little progress has been made since then. Never-
theless, WTO members managed to reach agreement 
on the 2013 “Bali package” (covering trade facilitation, 
food security in developing countries, and cotton 
trade), and the 2015 “Nairobi package” (including 
an agreement to eliminate agricultural export sub-
sidies).24 
Multilateral trade ambitions have faded since 
the 1990s due to a host of factors, such as emerging 
markets, shifting powers, and related national and 
regional interests, all on top of the large number of 
trade-related issues that are more complicated to nego-
tiate than tariff rates. The EU was one of a few WTO 
members that held on to a multilateral trade agenda, 
but eventually gave in to the new realities by starting 
 
21 Daniel T. Shedd, Brandon J. Murrill, and Jane M. Smith, 
Dispute Settlement in the World Trade Organization (WTO): An Over-
view, CRS Report for Congress, Washington, D.C.: Congressional 
Research Service (CRS), 2012, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/ 
misc/RS20088.pdf (accessed 8 December 2017). 
22 David Palmeter, “The WTO As a Legal System”, Fordham 
International Law Journal 24, no. 1 (2000): 444–80. 
23 See WTO, Annual Report 2016, 102, https://www.wto.org/ 
english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/anrep16_chap6_e.pdf 
(accessed 8 December 2017). 
24 ICTSD, “Overview of Outcomes of WTO’s 10th Ministerial 
in Nairobi”, BRIDGES Daily Updates, no. 5 (19 December 
2015), http://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges/news/ 
bridges-daily-update-5-overview-of-outcomes-of-wto%E2%80% 
99s-10th-ministerial-in (accessed 8 December 2017). 
to sound out the benefits of TTIP and CETA, both of 
which were negotiated intensively during the last 
years. Generally, the WTO’s relevance for global trade 
has always depended on the willingness of WTO mem-
bers to bring negotiations forward. 
The WTO and Environmental Protection 
Environmental concerns are acknowledged in the pre-
amble to the 1995 Agreement Establishing the WTO.25 
Together with the WTO, the Committee on Trade and 
Environment (CTE) was established, which elaborates 
the relationship between trade measures and environ-
mental measures and is in charge of promoting sus-
tainable development within the WTO. The CTE is 
open to all WTO members, with observers from inter-
governmental organisations regularly participating, 
including the UNFCCC Secretariat. Although climate 
change hardly featured in WTO discussions until 
2007, under the leadership of WTO Director-General 
Pascal Lamy (2005–2013), the organisation became 
actively involved in discussions on the climate and 
trade interface and published a joint report with the 
United Nations Environment Programme on the sub-
ject in 2009.26 However, already since the 1990s, the 
interface between trade and the environment has come 
to the fore, primarily through GATT/WTO case law. 
Regional Trade Agreements and 
Environmental Protection 
Already during the Uruguay Round (1986–1994) of 
trade negotiations, many GATT members turned to 
regional or bilateral trade agreements (see Figure 2). 
The formation and strengthening of major trade blocs 
in the Americas (NAFTA and Mercado Común del Sur 
[MERCOSUR]) and European economic integration 
(European Communities; European Free Trade Asso-
ciation, EFTA) incentivised other countries to either 
join those agreements or to establish their own.27 
Against the backdrop of globalisation, RTAs were 
perceived to help enhance market access, promote 
 
25 WTO, Agreement on Establishing the WTO (see note 17). 
26 Ludivine Tamiotti, Robert Teh, Vesile Kulaçoğlu et al., 
Trade and Climate Change. A Report by the United Nations Environ-
ment Programme and the World Trade Organization (Geneva, 
Nairobi: UNEP, 2009). 
27 Richard E. Baldwin, “The Causes of Regionalism”, 
The World Economy 20, no. 7 (1997): 865–88. 
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Figure 2 
Evolution of regional trade agreements in the world, 1948–2017 
Source: WTO, Regional Trade Agreements Information System (RTA-IS), http://rtais.wto.org/UI/charts.aspx# (accessed 13 February 
2018); own graph. 
 
foreign policy objectives, and influence the policies of 
trading partners.28 As a result, the number of RTAs has 
increased significantly in the last two decades, leading 
to a “spaghetti bowl” of trade agreements.29 By Febru-
ary 2018, the WTO had received 669 notifications of 
RTAs, 455 of which were in force at that time, com-
pared to 124 notifications to the GATT between 1948 
and 1994 (see Figure 2).30 
The WTO has to be notified of RTAs in accordance 
with Article XXIV GATT. In addition, under the WTO 
umbrella, there are two stand-alone plurilateral agree-
ments, as well as plurilateral agreements that extend 
concessions to all WTO members on an MFN basis. The 
Environmental Goods Agreement (EGA), which is cur-
rently being negotiated,31 falls into the latter category, 
 
28 Theresa Carpenter, “A Historical Perspective on Region-
alism”, in Multilateralizing Regionalism, ed. Patrick Low and 
Richard E. Baldwin (Cambridge/New York: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2009). 
29 Jagdish Bhagwati, “Regionalism versus Multilateralism”, 
The World Economy 15, no. 5 (1992): 535–56. 
30 See WTO website: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/ 
region_e/regfac_e.htm (accessed 13 February 2018). 
31 At the ministerial EGA talks in December 2016, no agree-
ment could be reached on a final text. Some negotiators 
announced the next WTO ministerial conference in Decem-
ber 2017 as a deadline. See ICTSD, “Ministerial Talks to Clinch 
Environmental Goods Agreement Hit Stumbling Block”, 
BRIDGES 20, no. 42 (2016), http://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/ 
bridges/news/ministerial-talks-to-clinch-environmental-goods-
meaning that the benefits of the agreement will apply 
to all WTO members once it is adopted. 
In recent years, the discussion of regionalism in 
the trade context has taken a new turn with the emer-
gence of mega-regional agreements.32 Negotiations on 
the EU-Canada CETA were concluded in August 2014 
and approved after intense political struggles in the 
EU in 2017. The TPP, which brings together Australia, 
Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New 
Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the US, and Vietnam, was 
signed in February 2016. However, following the with-
drawal of the US, the future of this mega-regional is 
uncertain, and first attempts are being made to revive 
the talks without the US.33 The negotiations of TTIP 
 
agreement-hit-stumbling. Some new momentum evolved 
mid-2017, see https://www.law360.com/articles/936873/wto-
members-angling-to-relaunch-green-goods-talks (accessed 
8 December 2017). 
32 Mega-regionals have been defined as “deep integration 
partnerships in the form of RTAs between countries or 
regions with a major share of world trade and [foreign direct 
investment] and in which two or more of the parties are in a 
paramount driver position, or serve as hubs, in global value 
chains”; World Economic Forum, Mega-regional Trade Agree-
ments: Game-Changers or Costly Distractions for the World Trading 
System? (Geneva: WEF, 2014), 13, http://www3.weforum.org/ 
docs/GAC/2014/WEF_GAC_TradeFDI_MegaRegionalTrade 
Agreements_Report_2014.pdf (accessed 8 December 2017). 
33 Cristian Rodriguez Chiffelle, “As Trump Ditches the TPP, 
What’s Next for the World’s Biggest Trade Deal?”, ICTSD, 
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between the EU and the US were regarded as “frozen” 
after the election of US President Trump in 2016.34 
The negotiations for the Regional Comprehensive Eco-
nomic Partnership (RCEP) involving 10 Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members, along with 
China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia, and New 
Zealand, have also come to a halt. 
Environmental provisions have become increasingly 
prevalent in RTAs. In 1993, NAFTA set the stage by in-
cluding a side-agreement (the North American Agree-
ment on Environmental Cooperation), with other US-
RTAs following suit. The EU also has begun to incor-
porate environmental provisions in its RTAs with 
third countries since the mid-1990s. EU trade agree-
ments with third countries are linked to an increasing 
number of multilateral environmental agreements, 
whereas US trade agreements have become more spe-
cific about the environmental action required, backed 
up by consultations and dispute-settlement proce-
dures in the agreement.35 The trend of including en-
vironmental provisions is continuing also in the 
negotiation of mega-regionals. Chapter 20 of the TPP 
and Chapter 24 of CETA are dedicated in their entirety 
to environmental issues, and a chapter on trade and 
sustainable development is the subject of the TTIP 
negotiations. Berger et al. (2017) looked into 48 RTAs 
of emerging economies for their environmental con-
tent, finding that these deals have become “greener” 
over time, in particular if the agreements involved 
countries from the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD).36 
 
14 December 2016, http://www.ictsd.org/opinion/as-trump-
ditches-the-tpp-what (accessed 8 December 2017); Mai Ngu-
yen, “Agreement in Meeting on TPP Trade Deal – Mexican 
Minister”, Reuters, 9 November 2017, https://uk.reuters.com/ 
article/uk-apec-summit-mexico/agreement-in-meeting-on-tpp-
trade-deal-mexican-minister-idUKKBN1D925X (accessed 
8 December 2017). 
34 Philip Blenkinsop, “U.S. Trade Talks in Deep Freeze after 
Trump Win, Says EU”, Reuters, 11 November 2016, http://www. 
reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-eu-trade-idUSKBN1361UN 
(accessed 8 December 2017). 
35 Sikina Jinnah and Elisa Morgera, “Environmental Provi-
sions in American and EU Free Trade Agreements. A Prelimi-
nary Comparison and Research Agenda”, Review of European, 
Comparative & International Environmental Law 22, no. 3 (2013): 
324–39. 
36 Axel Berger et al., Towards “Greening” Trade? Tracking En-
vironmental Provisions in the Preferential Trade Agreements of 
Emerging Markets, Discussion Paper (Bonn: Deutsches Institut 
für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE), 2017). 
The Investment Rules in RTAs 
Increasingly, RTAs incorporate investment rules. 
While under the WTO regime the Trade-Related Invest-
ment Measures (TRIMs) agreement prescribes how mar-
ket access should be secured, RTAs also can include 
rules for investor-state dispute settlements. The latter 
regulate companies’ rights to challenge the applica-
tion of national regulations. Investor-state dispute 
settlement was a critical issue during the TTIP nego-
tiations, for instance because big multilateral com-
panies could use the agreement to sue a government 
asking for compensation on foregone profits. Invest-
ment issues that do not relate to market access are 
regulated by bilateral investment treaties and not in 
RTAs. National climate policy could easily come under 
scrutiny by investors once the regional agreements 
include such clauses.37 The investigation of invest-
ment treaties, however, is beyond the scope of this 
paper. 
 
 
 
37 Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder and Jörg Haas, “When 
Climate Leaders Protect Dirty Investments”, Project Syndicate, 
7 November 2017, https://www.project-syndicate.org/ 
commentary/climate-trade-agreements-clean-energy-
investment-by-nathalie-bernasconi-osterwalder-and-j-rg-haas-
3-2017-11 (accessed 8 December 2017). 
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Identifying the Upcoming Issues for Trade and Climate Policy 
 
Following the Paris Agreement, the climate regime 
is intended to progress through the coordination of 
national action, review, and adjustment over time. 
Climate policy decisions (targets, timelines, measures) 
are left with the parties to the Paris Agreement for the 
time being. National climate actions, which are being 
announced through the NDCs, can have trade impli-
cations that stem from market-based and non-market 
mechanisms (emissions trading, regulation), technol-
ogy transfer rules and limitations, or from sectoral 
climate action for aviation and maritime transport, 
which are both outside the auspices of the Paris Agree-
ment. 
NDCs: Policy Measures with Trade 
Implications 
In the run-up to Paris, many parties to the UNFCCC 
submitted their intended NDCs. Countries were free 
to announce their climate policy targets, measures, or 
conditionality, such as financial demands for adapta-
tion and mitigation, as no particular formula applied 
to this new way of voluntary commitment. Trade 
implications from NDCs arise for all measures that 
tax, subsidise, or regulate national economic activ-
ities, and which relate directly or indirectly to other 
countries’ participation in trade. 
A first analysis shows that in 90 intended NDCs,38 
using international market mechanisms is indicated, 
whereas in 45 this tool is not mentioned at all. Mostly 
low-income countries intend to sell some type of miti-
gation unit to source carbon finance flows – provided 
such a trading option materialises under Article 6 of 
the Paris Agreement. However, there are currently 
only a small number of countries willing to buy such 
units (e.g. Japan, Norway, Switzerland, Turkey). Some 
countries have expressed their interest in using inter-
 
38 Out of a total of 163 INDC submissions at http://www4. 
unfccc.int/submissions/indc/Submission%20Pages/submission
s.aspx (accessed 8 December 2017). The EU INDC counts as 
one submission (comprising 28 EU Member States). The total 
number of parties that submitted INDCs by March 2017 was 
191. 
national market mechanisms in the future (29), where-
as others have explicitly rejected them (18).39 
The intended NDCs show that many countries plan 
to address emissions through investment in renewable 
energy. Some countries have laid out detailed policy 
intentions. Most parties have announced relative or 
absolute targets (e.g. India: wind power installation of 
60 GW, solar power of 100 GW by 2022; China: increas-
ing the share of non-fossil fuels to 15 per cent of energy 
consumption by 2020 and to 20 per cent by 2030; EU: 
40 per cent greenhouse gas emission reductions by 
2030, no details on energy targets).40 
Given the high profile of the NDCs in the Paris 
Agreement, the national approaches could be increas-
ingly exposed to scrutiny by trade partners, but they 
will also set the stage for an international exchange 
on policy practice. 
“Cooperative Approaches” – a New Setting for 
International Policy Tools 
The Kyoto Protocol introduced market-based, flexible 
mechanisms (Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), 
Joint Implementation (JI), and international emissions 
trading) for its parties to help them deliver emission 
 
39 Based on an analysis by Nicolas Kreibich, Wuppertal Insti-
tute, presented at 16th Climate Technology Workshop, 23–24 
June 2016, Berlin; Nicolas Kreibich and Wolfgang Obergassel, 
Carbon Markets after Paris. How to Account for the Transfer of Mitiga-
tion Results?, JIKO Policy Paper no. 1/2016 (Wuppertal: Wupper-
tal Institute for Climate, Environment and Energy, January 
2016). See also Clara Brandi, Trade Elements in Countries’ Climate 
Contributions under the Paris Agreement, Issue Paper (Geneva: 
ICTSD, March 2017), http://www.ictsd.org/sites/default/files/ 
research/trade_elements_in_countries_climate_contributions. 
pdf (accessed 8 December 2017). 
40 See UNFCCC website: http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/ 
indc/Submission%20Pages/submissions.aspx (accessed 8 De-
cember 2017). For an analysis of NDCs with regard to trade, 
see Rana Elkahwagy, Vandana Gyanchandani, and Dario 
Piselli, UNFCCC Nationally Determined Contributions: Climate 
Change and Trade, Centre for Trade and Economic Integration 
(CTEI) Working Paper 2017-02 (Geneva: CTEI, Graduate Insti-
tute of International and Development Studies, 9 January 
2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
2919692 (accessed 8 December 2017). 
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reductions in an economically efficient way. The Paris 
Agreement has broadened the scope for using such 
mechanisms on a voluntary basis, while at the same 
time leaving open the further design and implementa-
tion of these mechanisms. This has created uncertainty 
not only about the future of the CDM, but also about 
the new mechanisms and the future rules on verifying 
and the trading of yet-to-be defined emissions rights 
under the UNFCCC from 2020 onwards. Given that 
roughly half of all intended NDCs submitted to date 
are conditional upon access to international markets, 
the importance of these provisions cannot be over-
stated.41 Despite the political divisions surrounding 
the concept of markets in the climate negotiations, 
parties expressly acknowledged the “important role 
of […] tools such as […] carbon pricing”.42 
Article 6 of the Paris Agreement (PA) identifies vari-
ous concepts43 for voluntary cooperative approaches – 
terminology that replaces the language of the Kyoto 
Protocol – to climate change mitigation. Two of these 
approaches enable the emergence of carbon markets 
across national jurisdictions. First, Articles 6.2 and 6.3 
establish that cooperative approaches can result in 
“internationally transferred mitigation outcomes”, 
such as linked emissions trading systems. Some ele-
mentary principles are set out in Articles 6.1 and 6.2, 
such as the need to ensure environmental integrity 
and transparency, robust accounting, and the avoid-
ance of double counting. It is widely expected that 
guidance by the Conference of the Parties serving as 
the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement 
(CMA) – scheduled for adoption at COP 24 in Decem-
ber 2018 – will be limited to the creation of an 
accounting and transparency framework, whereas 
material criteria for the nature and stringency of 
carbon units will be defined at the domestic level.44 
 
41 Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) and International 
Emissions Trading Association (IETA), Carbon Pricing. The Paris 
Agreement’s Key Ingredient, 2016, http://www.ieta.org/resources/ 
Resources/Reports/Carbon_Pricing_The_Paris_Agreements_ 
Key_Ingredient.pdf (accessed 8 December 2017). 
42 UNFCCC, Decision 1/CP.21. 
43 Voluntary cooperative approaches, internationally trans-
ferred mitigation outcomes, mechanisms that contribute to 
mitigation and support sustainable development, and non-
market approaches. UNFCCC, Paris Agreement, Article 6. 
44 Kazuhisa Koakutsu, “Cooperative Implementation of the 
Joint Crediting Mechanism (JCM) as an Example of Article 6.2 
Activities”, Carbon Mechanisms Review, no. 1 (2016), http:// 
www.carbon-mechanisms.de/fileadmin/media/dokumente/ 
Publikationen/CMR_2016_01_Dawning_bf.pdf (accessed 8 De-
cember 2017). 
Second, Article 6.4 establishes a “mechanism to 
contribute to the mitigation of greenhouse gas emis-
sions and support sustainable development” (labelled 
by some as “sustainable development mechanism”). 
The negotiating history indicates that this mechanism 
would bear resemblance to a baseline-and-credit sys-
tem such as the CDM under the Kyoto Protocol.45 
Unlike the broader scope of cooperative approaches 
(Articles 6.2 and 6.3 PA), the operation of a sustainable 
development mechanism will be governed by modal-
ities and procedures currently under negotiation; it is 
likely to be subject to material and procedural control 
of the CMA and supervised by a body that has yet to 
be designated. Finally, yet importantly, Article 6 opens 
the way for specific coalitions among countries that 
use emissions trading and are considering coordinating 
actions and rules, or even linking their systems. This 
option is favoured, for instance, by the EU, which has 
recently agreed to link its Emissions Trading System 
(ETS) to that of Switzerland, and has expressed interest 
in other linkages.46 
Among experts there are different views on wheth-
er emissions units would constitute goods under the 
GATT – or services under the GATS – with a majority of 
commentators concluding that they are neither.47 By 
contrast, in-depth analyses are available for how regu-
lations of national or supranational emissions trading 
systems, such as the inclusion of importers or free allo-
cation rules, could contradict trade rules (see Section 
“National and Regional Carbon Pricing”, p. 19). Greater 
agreement exists that services provided in the context 
of markets for different tradable climate-related units 
– for instance, greenhouse gas emission allowances, 
offset credits, or renewable energy and energy efficiency 
certificates in energy markets – fall under the GATS.48 
 
45 Andrei Marcu, Carbon Market Provisions in the Paris Agreement 
(Article 6) (2016), 11–12, http://www.ceps-ech.eu/sites/default/ 
files/SR%20No%20128%20ACM%20Post%20COP21%20Analysis
%20of%20Article%206.pdf (accessed 8 December 2017). 
46 See Sonja Hawkins and Ingrid Jegou, Linking Emissions 
Trading Schemes: Considerations and Recommendations for a Joint 
EU-Korean Carbon Market, Issue Paper no. 3/2014 (Geneva: 
ICTSD, 2014). 
47 Jacob Werksman, “Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading 
and the WTO”, Review of European Community and International 
Environmental Law 8, no. 3 (1999); Steve Charnovitz, “Trade and 
Climate: Potential Conflicts and Synergies”, in Beyond Kyoto: 
Advancing the International Effort against Climate Change, ed. Pew 
Center on Global Climate Change (2003), 141–70; Nat Keo-
hane, Anna Petsonk, and Alex Hanafi, “Toward a Club of Car-
bon Markets”, Climatic Change 144, no. 1 (2015): 81–95. 
48 Marisa Martin, “Trade Law Implications of Restricting Par-
ticipation in the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme”, 
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These markets have seen robust growth, including the 
number of intermediaries (banks, brokers, exchanges, 
insurances, project developers, data providers, and 
verifiers). Still, there remains some uncertainty among 
scholars as to when exactly these services are covered 
by the GATS, and more specifically its Annex on Finan-
cial Services.49 Driven by the private sector, some pri-
mary markets for units have also given rise to second-
ary markets for derivative products, which expressly 
fall within the scope of the Annex on Financial Ser-
vices. Although some variability again exists between 
individual Schedules of Commitments, a majority of 
members will have committed to exercising non-dis-
crimination subject to MFN, market access, and 
national treatment principles.50 
More controversial and politically sensitive issues 
could arise if emissions trading or carbon pricing 
coalitions (often called “clubs”)51 emerge with rules 
that discriminate among WTO members, for instance 
by excluding trade with non-parties or excluding trade 
with parties based on the strength of respective emis-
sions trading schemes (i.e. their environmental integ-
rity). Environmental integrity has already been an 
issue for certain Kyoto Protocol units in the EU ETS, 
for which fungibility was restricted, based on their 
geographic origin (EU, 2009, Article 11a.4).52 In that 
event, cooperative approaches could potentially come 
under the ambit of the trade regime, if the entire 
rationale is premised on the ability to exclude non-
members from a club benefit.53 
 
The Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 19, no. 3 
(2007); James Munro, “Trade in Carbon Units As a Financial 
Service under International Trade Law: Recent Developments, 
Future Challenges”, Carbon & Climate Law Review 8, no. 2 (2014): 
437–74. 
49 For an overview, cf. Munro, “Trade in Carbon Units”, ibid. 
50 A database providing members’ commitments can be 
found at http://i-tip.wto.org/services/default.aspx (accessed 
8 December 2017). 
51 The Carbon Pricing Leadership Coalition is an initiative 
without any legal framework: https://www.carbonpricing 
leadership.org/leadership-coalition/ (accessed 8 December 
2017). 
52 See Christina Voigt, “WTO Law and International Emis-
sions Trading: Is There Potential for Conflict?”, Carbon and 
Climate Law Review 1, no. 2 (2008): 54–66. For such an inter-
pretation of Article 6, see EDF and IETA, Carbon Pricing (see 
note 41), 5–6. 
53 William Nordhaus, “Climate Clubs. Overcoming Free-
riding in International Climate Policy”, American Economic 
Review 105, no. 4 (2015): 1339–70. 
Transfer of Climate-friendly Technologies 
The need for technology transfer has been recognised 
in the climate regime (Article 4.5 UNFCCC, Article 10 
PA). The Paris Agreement emphasises that the means 
of implementation (finance, technology, and capacity 
building) have to be provided by the industrialised 
countries to developing countries. However, the agree-
ment does not prescribe how the transfer of climate-
friendly technologies should be conducted, or how 
intellectual property rights (IPRs) should be handled.54 
This is left to further negotiations, inter alia under 
the auspices of the Paris Agreement, under the WTO 
(including the TRIPS Agreement), and the talks on the 
EGA. Although a Technology Mechanism was estab-
lished at UNFCCC talks in Cancún in 2010, the thorny 
issue of IPRs has remained unaddressed.55 
The TRIPS Agreement rules (see Table , p. 23) do 
not resolve the longstanding dispute over the strength 
and enforcement of IPRs or on the definition of tech-
nologies per se.56 The most important IPR issue in the 
climate context are patents, but other IPR tools are 
relevant too (e.g. trademarks, plant variety rights, cer-
tification marks).57 This debate was also taken up in 
 
54 On the history of IPR protection, see Padmashree Gehl 
Sampath and Pedro Roffe, Unpacking the International Technology 
Transfer Debate: Fifty Years and Beyond, Working Paper (2012), 
http://www.ictsd.org/downloads/2012/07/unpacking-the-
international-technology-transfer-debate-fifty-years-and-
beyond.pdf (accessed 8 December 2017). 
55 Ahmed Abdel Latif, Keith Maskus, Ruth Okediji et al., Over-
coming the Impasse on Intellectual Property and Climate Change at 
the UNFCCC: A Way Forward, Policy Brief no. 11/2011 (Geneva: 
ICTSD, 2014), http://www.ictsd.org/sites/default/files/research/ 
2012/02/overcoming-the-impasse-on-intellectual-property-and-
climate-change-at-the-unfccc-a-way-forward.pdf (accessed 8 De-
cember 2017). 
56 David G. Ockwell, Intellectual Property Rights and Low Carbon 
Technology Transfer to Developing Countries – A Review of the Evi-
dence to Date, 2008, https://www.sussex.ac.uk/webteam/ 
gateway/file.php?name=spru-teri-ids-phase-2-iprs-and-low-c-tt-
final.pdf&site=264 (accessed 8 December 2017); Peter K. Yu, 
“Intellectual Property Enforcement and Global Climate 
Change”, in Research Handbook on Intellectual Property and Climate 
Change, ed. Joshua D. Sarnoff (Cheltenham, UK, and North-
ampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2016), 107–25. In 2010, the WTO 
provided an overview for policy-makers, identifying the rele-
vant standards of the TRIPS agreement for climate negotia-
tions. WTO, The WTO TRIPS Agreement – A Practical Overview for 
Climate Change Policy Makers (Geneva: WTO, 2010), https://www. 
wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/trips_and_climate_paper_e.pdf 
(accessed 8 December 2017). 
57 Scott Barrett, “Rethinking Global Climate Change Govern-
ance”, Economics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal 3, 
no. 5 (2009). 
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the WTO CTE when, in 2011, China and India made a 
joint submission, claiming that IPRs must not become 
a barrier for the transfer of environmentally sound 
technologies, which was supported by Ecuador in 
2013.58 Thus, protection of IPRs for climate-friendly 
technologies will remain on the list of negotiations 
and requires closer cooperation among the trade part-
ners under the Paris Agreement and the WTO. 
Global Sectoral Policies: 
Aviation and Maritime Transport 
Aviation and maritime shipping have been largely 
excluded from the climate regime. They were subject 
to UNFCCC negotiations, but the Paris Agreement does 
not mention them. Instead, and following Article 2.2 
of the Kyoto Protocol, negotiations on regulating emis-
sions from international aviation and marine bunker 
fuels take place under the auspices of the Internation-
al Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the Inter-
national Maritime Organization (IMO). As neither of 
the agencies initially demonstrated material progress, 
the EU announced in 2012 that it would include inter-
national aviation in its ETS from 2013 onwards. This 
unilateral action against globally operating sectors 
led to significant tensions,59 and the EU suspended its 
measure under international pressure. However, this 
arguably helped revive the negotiations under the 
ICAO and the IMO. Both organisations struggle with 
discord about the necessity, design, and economic con-
sequences of measures to limit aviation and shipping 
emissions; strong pressure from industry groups; as 
well as asymmetrical interests of coalitions of states. 
At its 39th Session in 2016, the ICAO Assembly adopted 
an international market-based measure to limit avia-
tion emissions designated the Carbon Offsetting and 
Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA).60 
 
58 See the Third World Network website: http://www.twn.my/ 
title2/climate/info.service/2013/climate130602.htm (accessed 
8 December 2017). 
59 Susanne Dröge and Philipp M. Richter, Emissionshandel für 
den Luftverkehr. Internationaler Widerstand gegen den Alleingang 
der EU, SWP Comments 55/2012 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft 
und Politik, September 2012). 
60 International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), Draft 
Text for the Report on Agenda Item 22 (Montreal: ICAO, 2016), see 
http://www.icao.int/Meetings/a39/Documents/WP/wp_462_en.
pdf (accessed 8 December 2017). For a general discussion, see 
Alejandro Piera, “Compliance Tools for a Global Market Based 
Measure for Aviation. Designing the Legal Form of a Global 
Under this scheme, any growth in CO2 emissions from 
international aviation above 2020 levels will have to be 
compensated through the purchase and surrender of 
emission offsets. During an initial pilot phase from 
2021 to 2023 and the first implementation phase from 
2024 to 2026, the scheme will only apply to airlines 
from states voluntarily opting to participate in CORSIA. 
Starting with the second phase from 2027 to 2035, 
exceptions will apply only for least developed coun-
tries, land-locked developing countries, small island 
developing states, and countries with low levels of 
aviation activity. 
The IMO, however, does not have a strategy on 
reducing shipping emissions yet. During the talks in 
December 2016, the members agreed to adopt an ini-
tial carbon-cutting strategy in 2018 and a final one 
in 2023.61 
The role of the trade regime is limited here, too. 
The GATS offers little guidance in two annexes on air 
and maritime transport services. Under the “Annex on 
Air Transport Services”, aviation is generally excluded 
from the substantive scope of the GATS, with some 
minor exceptions. For shipping, the corresponding 
“Annex on Negotiations on Maritime Transport Ser-
vices” states that MFN treatment only applies follow-
ing the conclusion of additional negotiations on mari-
time transport services within the WTO. The Council 
for Trade in Services suspended the maritime trans-
port negotiations until the commencement of the 
next comprehensive round of services negotiations, 
which are still ongoing.62 
ICAO’s CORSIA scheme will not supersede any ex-
isting treaty-based trade commitments between ICAO 
members under the legal principle of lex posterior 
derogat legi priori. Still, the outcome and consensus it 
reflects can have a significant bearing on the interpre-
tation of Article XX GATT when defending trade-restric-
tive climate measures, especially where these apply to 
the transport sector and international spaces. 
 
Aviation Market Based Measure”, Carbon & Climate Law Review, 
no. 2 (2016): 144–52. 
61 Ed King, “Mayday, Mayday: UN’s Shipping Body Needs a 
Climate Compass”, Climate Home (31 October 2016), http:// 
www.climatechangenews.com/2016/10/31/mayday-mayday-
uns-shipping-body-needs-a-climate-compass/ (accessed 8 De-
cember 2017). 
62 WTO, Decision on Maritime Transport Services, Adopted by the 
Council for Trade in Services on 28 June 1996, WTO Doc. S/L/24 of 
3 July 1996; see WTO website: https://www.wto.org/english/ 
tratop_e/serv_e/18-mar_e.htm (accessed 8 December 2017). 
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National and Regional Carbon Pricing: 
Emissions Trading and Carbon Taxes 
Under the Paris Agreement, parties will implement 
mitigation policies at the national level. The applica-
tion of carbon pricing (CO2 taxes, emissions trading 
schemes) in industrialised and emerging economies 
affects energy prices and industries’ competitiveness, 
while it also induces technological innovation.63 
Because the producers who face carbon costs often 
operate in international markets, additional costs 
could induce carbon leakage, which is an undesired 
side-effect from an uncoordinated carbon pricing 
policy. Emissions increase outside the country that 
implements carbon pricing – this is mainly due to the 
partial or full production relocation of firms to other 
countries without carbon costs. Carbon leakage puts 
into question the environmental effectiveness of uni-
lateral carbon pricing or regulation. However, trade 
policy can play a crucial role in preventing carbon 
leakage, making carbon pricing a critical issue for 
the trade-and-climate policy connection. 
If imported goods also fell under the importing 
countries’ carbon pricing policies (tax or emissions 
allowances coverage), this could prevent carbon leak-
age. Policies implemented to this end are collectively 
referred to as “border carbon adjustments” (BCAs). They 
can work both ways (pricing imports and reimbursing 
exports), and resemble border tax adjustments, which 
are commonly applied for consumption taxes (such as 
value added tax).64 The introduction of a BCA has been 
 
63 See, for instance, Joost Pauwelyn, U.S. Federal Climate Policy 
and Competitiveness Concerns: The Limits and Options of International 
Trade Law, Working Paper 07-02 (Durham: Duke University, 
The Nicholas Institute, 2007), https://nicholasinstitute.duke. 
edu/sites/default/files/publications/u.s.-federal-climate-policy-
and-competitiveness-concerns-the-limits-and-options-of-
international-trade-law-paper.pdf; Susanne Dröge, Tackling 
Leakage in a World of Unequal Carbon Prices (London: Climate 
Strategies, 2009), http://www2.centre-cired.fr/IMG/pdf/cs_ 
tackling_leakage_report_final.pdf (accessed 8 December 
2017); Christoph Böhringer, Edward J. Balistreri, and Thomas 
F. Rutherford, “The Role of Border Carbon Adjustment in 
Unilateral Climate Policy. Overview of an Energy Modeling 
Forum Study (EMF 29)”, Energy Economics 34 (2012): 97–110. 
64 Aaron Cosbey, The Trade Implications of the Paris COP21 Agree-
ment, International Trade Working Paper 17/2016 (London: 
Commonwealth Secretariat, 2016); Aaron Cosbey, Susanne 
Droege, Carolyn Fischer et al., A Guide for the Concerned: Guid-
ance on the Elaboration and Implementation of Border Carbon Ad-
justment, Policy Report 3 (Winnipeg: IISD, 2012), http://www. 
iisd.org/pdf/2012/bca_guidance.pdf. 
explored in the EU65 and in the US (e.g. in the unsuc-
cessful American Clean Energy and Security Act of 
2010, or the proposed American Opportunity Carbon 
Fee Act of 2014).66 Behind the border, the policy design 
could include free allowance allocation, tax exemp-
tions or other payments that compensate for cost in-
creases for companies which compete internationally. 
The discussion on trade measures that complement 
national climate policy has gained traction in 2017. 
The risk, however, is that these measures would serve 
purely protectionist or retaliatory purposes. Policy-
makers who consider BCAs as a tool for inclusion in 
their portfolios would have two basic routes for the 
design of such measures. One option is to establish a 
BCA along the requirements of Article III GATT for 
domestic policy tools, following several criteria under 
Article II.2(a), which apply to a legal border tax adjust-
ment. The second option is to design a BCA in such a 
way that it passes the tests of Article XX GATT to qualify 
for an exception.67 Because there is considerable un-
certainty under existing WTO jurisprudence, this is 
adding to the question of WTO legality of BCAs, but 
also to the general question of their desirability.68 
Most importantly, any BCA must not serve to protect 
domestic industries.69 Thus, a BCA, has to target car-
bon leakage reduction and refer to the carbon content 
of a traded good. 
The free allocation of allowances to companies and 
the indirect or direct payments to compensate for car-
 
65 Lorand Bartels, “The WTO Legality of the Application of 
the EU’s Emission Trading System to Aviation”, European Jour-
nal of International Law 23, no. 2 (2012); cf. Dröge and Richter, 
Emissionshandel für den Luftverkehr. Internationaler Widerstand 
gegen den Alleingang der EU (see note 59); Roland Ismer and 
Karsten Neuhoff, “Border Tax Adjustment. A Feasible Way to 
Support Stringent Emission Trading”, European Journal of Law 
and Economics 24, no. 2 (2007): 137–64. 
66 Harro van Asselt and Thomas Brewer, “Addressing Com-
petitiveness and Leakage Concerns in Climate Policy. An 
Analysis of Border Adjustment Measures in the US and the 
EU”, Energy Policy 38, no. 1 (2010): 42–51; Sam Kortum and 
David Weisbach, Border Adjustments for Carbon Emissions. Basic 
Concepts and Design, Discussion Paper 9/2016 (Washington, 
D.C.: Resources for the Future, 2016); cf. Pauwelyn, U.S. Federal 
Climate Policy and Competitiveness Concerns (see note 63); Ismer 
and Neuhoff, “Border Tax Adjustment” (see note 65). 
67 Cosbey, Droege, Fischer et al., A Guide for the Concerned 
(see note 64). 
68 Kasturi Das, “Climate Clubs: Carrots, Sticks and More”, 
Economic & Political Weekly 50, no. 34 (2015). 
69 Ludivine Tamiotti, “The Legal Interface between Carbon 
Corder Measures and Trade Rules”, Climate Policy 11, no. 5 
(2011): 1209; cf. Tamiotti, Teh, Kulaçoğlu et al., Trade and Cli-
mate Change (see note 26). 
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bon costs could be problematic from a trade policy 
point of view, too, especially if they tend to overcom-
pensate for the actual cost impact. Then the policy 
may result in subsidisation and could be challenged 
under the SCM Agreement. Although this situation 
is speculative, it has a strong link to the disputes over 
subsidies for renewable energy. 
Energy Subsidies 
Subsidies play an important role in implementing the 
Paris Agreement in two ways. They help foster renew-
able energy investments and production on the one 
hand, and, on the other hand, abolishing the subsidies 
for fossil fuels reduces the production and consump-
tion levels of carbon-intensive fuels. The International 
Energy Agency finds that consumption subsidies were 
responsible for 13 per cent of global carbon dioxide 
emissions in 2014, with the implicit subsidy amount-
ing to $115 per tonne of CO2, on average.70 As energy 
can be seen as both a good and a service, it is governed 
by different WTO rules, including – but not limited to 
– the SCM Agreement. 
Subsidy rules, in theory, also apply to fossil fuel sub-
sidies. In practice, however, their application has proven 
difficult. In contrast to renewable energy support, no 
fossil fuel subsidy has ever been challenged by a WTO 
member. For consumer subsidies, a key challenge is to 
prove that such subsidies are “specific”, given that the 
benefits of such subsidies generally accrue to a broad 
group of producers and/or consumers.71 More impor-
tantly, however, notification rates of subsidies have gen-
erally been low due to a lack of commitment, a lack of 
clarity about which subsidies need to be reported, and 
the inherent difficulties of estimating them.72 Even if 
WTO members do report subsidies, the surveillance 
 
70 International Energy Agency (IEA), World Energy Outlook 
Special Report: Energy and Climate Change (Paris: IEA, 2015), 
https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/ 
WEO2015SpecialReportonEnergyandClimateChange.pdf 
(accessed 8 December 2017). 
71 Henok Birhanu Asmelash, “Energy Subsidies and WTO 
Dispute Settlement. Why Only Renewable Energy Subsidies 
Are Challenged?”, Journal of International Economic Law 18, 
no. 2 (2015): 261–85. 
72 Liesbeth Casier, Robin Fraser, Mark Halle et al., “Shining 
a Light on Fossil Fuel Subsidies at the WTO. How NGOs Can 
Contribute to WTO Notification and Surveillance”, World 
Trade Review 13, no. 4 (2014): 603–32. 
mechanism rarely leads to the questioning of the 
subsidies.73 
 
 
73 Ronald Steenblik and Juan Simón, A New Template for Noti-
fying Subsidies to the WTO (Winnipeg: IISD, 2011). 
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WTO Provisions and Disputes That Matter for the 
Upcoming National Climate Policy Challenges 
 
The climate policies that the Paris Agreement brings 
about for the EU and other national governments will 
increase the role of trade rules under the WTO as well 
as plurilateral and regional trade agreements. In order 
to understand the role of the GATT/WTO rules for the 
implementation of climate measures, we take a look 
at them and at the components of the WTO regime. 
Frequently, the argument is made that the support of 
climate policies through the application of trade tools 
or measures that relate indirectly to trade is not in 
line with WTO rules. Another argument is that the 
design of such measures along the demands of the 
WTO regime could be too complex. However, already 
today, the WTO dispute settlement system is concerned 
with a rising number of cases that relate to energy 
policies which aim at reducing emissions. This indi-
cates that more expert capacity for – and knowledge 
about – mutual support or conflict will be needed. 
The GATT Rules and Climate Policy 
The trade rules under the WTO are based on the prin-
ciples of transparency, predictability, and stability.74 
Their purpose is to reduce transaction costs for the 
WTO members and to provide a basis for applying 
trade measures among them. Article I GATT sets up 
the MFN obligation, which also creates a multiplier 
effect for bilateral talks: If one member agrees on a 
lower tariff with a trade partner, these tariffs will 
apply automatically to all other WTO members. Thus, 
discrimination among WTO members requires a spe-
cific justification, as non-discrimination is key. It is 
also incorporated in Article III GATT (the national 
treatment obligation), which demands that imported 
products should be treated on par with “like” domesti-
cally produced goods. In particular, Article II.2 (a) GATT 
allows a WTO member to impose a charge on an im-
ported product that is equivalent to an internal tax 
that the member concerned has imposed on “like” 
domestic products, or on an article from which the 
imported product has been produced in whole or in 
 
74 Van Asselt, Fragmentation of Global Climate Governance 
(see note 12), 161. 
part. However, it also needs to be guaranteed that 
such a border tax adjustment abides by the national 
treatment requirements (Article III.2 GATT), which 
ensure that imported products are not discriminated 
against when compared to “like” domestic products. 
The non-discrimination among WTO members and 
among traded goods and domestically produced “like” 
products poses a big challenge for climate policy-
making. The “likeness” of products as understood – 
though not defined – under the WTO regime is a key 
element of addressing emissions, as emissions are 
often part of the production process and cannot be 
found in the physical characteristics of a traded good. 
For example, high levels of emissions during the pro-
duction of steel fall in the category of non-product-
related processes and production methods (PPMs), and 
thus shall not be regarded as a cause to discriminate 
against traded steel products at the border. From a 
climate policy perspective, however, differentiation 
between imports or exports based on their non-
product-related PPMs (i.e. their “embedded carbon”) 
could be regarded as necessary for an effective national 
mitigation policy, but this would need justification 
under the WTO rules.75 The legality of BCAs or carbon 
taxes applied to imported goods hinges to a large 
extent on this particular point. 
Articles VI and XVI GATT provide the basic prin-
ciples on subsidies and countervailing duties (CVD) 
in the GATT/WTO system, whereas the SCM Agreement 
is an implementation agreement (see also subsection 
below). Article XVI GATT contains general provisions 
against subsidies that expand the exporting of primary 
products or lower the export prices of other products 
below those prevailing in the domestic market. Article 
VI GATT provides for the imposition of CVDs to offset 
subsidies granted, directly or indirectly, on the manu-
facture, production, or export of any merchandise. To 
impose a CVD, however, injury or threat of injury to 
an established industry must be determined. Alterna-
 
75 Pauwelyn, U.S. Federal Climate Policy and Competitiveness Con-
cerns (see note 63); Joost Pauwelyn, “Carbon Leakage Measures 
and Border Tax Adjustments under WTO Law”, in Research Hand-
book on Environment, Health and the WTO, ed. Geert van Calster 
and Denise Prévost (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2013). 
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tively, the subsidy must be shown to retard the estab-
lishment of an equivalent domestic industry.76 
An important set of exemptions is made in Article 
XX GATT. Article XX is a key clause for the discussion 
on how climate policy measures can be justified under 
– and supported by – the international trade regime. 
It opens the way for policy measures that are deemed 
necessary to follow, other than purely trade-centred 
ambitions. Non-discrimination, for instance, can be 
suspended, provided that certain conditions are met. 
Two of these exceptions relate to environmental con-
cerns: if discrimination is “necessary to protect human, 
animal, or plant life or health” (Article XX [b]) or if it 
relates to “the conservation of exhaustible natural 
resources if such measures are made effective in con-
junction with restrictions on domestic production and 
consumption” (Article XX [g]). For all exceptions, the 
conditions stipulated in the introductory part (cha-
peau) of Article XX need to be met. Any measure thus 
has to pass the test of “arbitrary or unjustifiable dis-
crimination” or disguised trade restrictiveness.77 
Other WTO Agreements and Their Relevance 
for Climate-and-Trade Policy Interactions 
In addition to the GATT, a set of other WTO agree-
ments are relevant for the interactions between 
climate and trade policy, as they regulate specific 
aspects of trade in goods (e.g. property rights or 
standards) or in services. Seven of them are of par-
ticular relevance to climate policy. We give an over-
view in the Table on p. 23. 
Examples of EU and US WTO Disputes with 
Climate Policy Relevance 
Over time, exporting countries have challenged vari-
ous environmental requirements of importing coun-
tries on the grounds that they constitute protection-
ism, and that the importing country is exercising an 
unacceptable form of regulation in areas beyond its 
national jurisdiction. Asian countries, for example 
India, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Thailand, were pro-
 
76 Arvind Panagariya, Core WTO Agreements: Trade in Goods and 
Services and Intellectual Property (New York, NY: Columbia Uni-
versity, 2002), http://www.columbia.edu/~ap2231/Courses/ 
wto-overview.pdf. 
77 Cosbey, Droege, Fischer et al., A Guide for the Concerned 
(see note 64). 
testing that the US was interfering in internal affairs 
when the US banned shrimp imports from these 
countries which were caught without turtle-excluding 
devices – killing endangered sea turtles as by-catch. 
The WTO Appellate Body, which eventually ruled on 
the US fishing standards contested in the 1990 Tuna/ 
Dolphin78 and the 1996 Shrimp/Turtle79 cases, moved the 
debate into a new direction, as it found that the US had 
the right to protect the global resource (e.g. migrating 
turtles) with its trade measure. The negative economic 
effects on the exporting countries were also part of the 
discussion about non-product-related PPMs, as PPMs 
can create financial and technological burdens for 
developing countries’ producers.80 
Climate-related disputes are still a small proportion 
of the total number of disputes initiated under the 
WTO’s dispute settlement system. The latest cases can 
be linked to national climate policy targets and dem-
onstrate a growing tension between trade rules and 
national renewable energy laws and policies. In addi-
tion, anti-dumping measures have increased, thereby 
involving allegations related to unfair subsidies, the 
use of specific requirements concerning the share of 
locally produced inputs (local content requirements, 
LCRs), and/or the calculations of CVDs. Energy-policy-
related WTO disputes have emerged since 2010 – illus-
trating this trend81 – and involved the EU, the US, 
Canada, China, Japan, India, and others. Subject to the 
disputes are trade in solar cells, solar panels, or mod-
ules; trade in wind power equipment; and national 
support for suppliers of solar and wind equipment 
through LCRs and through subsidies, which have led 
to allegations of dumping. 
 
78 GATT, United States – Restrictions on Import of Tuna (Geneva: 
WTO, 1990), see https://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/ 
SULPDF/91530924.pdf; WTO DS381, United States – Measures 
Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna 
Products (Geneva: WTO, 2008), see: https://www.wto.org/english/ 
tratop_e/dispu_e/381r_e.pdf (accessed 8 December 2017). 
79 WTO DS58, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp 
and Shrimp Products, (Geneva: WTO, 1996), see https://www. 
wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds58_e.htm; WTO, 
United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products (Geneva: WTO, 1996), see https://www.wto.org/english/ 
tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds61_e.htm (accessed 8 December 2017). 
80 Rafael Leal-Arcas, “Unilateral Trade-related Climate 
Change Measure”, The Journal of World Investment & Trade 
13, no. 6 (2012): 875–927; cf. Cosbey, Droege, Fischer et al., 
A Guide for the Concerned (see note 64). 
81 For detailed information on the cases, see Susanne Droege 
et al., The Trade System and Climate Action: Ways Forward under the 
Paris Agreement, Working Paper (London: Climate Strategies, 
October 2016), Annex “Climate-related WTO disputes”, 52 ff. 
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Table 
WTO agreements that are relevant for national climate policy action 
GATS 
General Agreement on  
Trade in Services 
Scope of agreement and purpose: 
Any service in any sector except those supplied in the exercise of 
governmental authority. 
Approach  Schedules of Commitments. A positive list of services that members 
want to liberalise. 
Basic Principle(s)  Art. II.1 GATS: Most Favoured Nation Principle  
Relevance  If climate policy measures affect trade in service sectors that are 
listed in the GATS. 
Environmental services are being discussed at the Special Session of 
the Committee on Trade in Services.a 
TRIMs 
Agreement on Trade-Related 
Investment Measures 
Scope of agreement and purpose: 
Investment measures related to trade in goods only, coverage limited 
to prohibition of TRIMs inconsistent with Art. III (national treatment) 
or Art. XI (general elimination of quantitative restrictions) GATT.b 
Approach  Non-exhaustive, illustrative list of inconsistent measures; most-
prominent one are local content requirements (LCRs). 
Basic Principle(s)  Art. III GATT (national treatment); Art. XI GATT (general elimination 
of quantitative restrictions). Transparency in domestic rules and 
discrimination for investing. 
Relevance  The TRIMs Agreement is one of the most cited WTO agreements in 
disputes relating to LCRs pertaining to renewable energy policies (see 
Sections “Cooperative Approaches”, p. 15, and “Examples of EU and US 
WTO Disputes”, p. 22). Some NDCs address national employment and 
industrial policy strategies (investments in new energy). 
TRIPS 
Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights 
Scope of agreement and purpose: 
IPRs that relate to traded products. 
Approach  Provides a “minimum” standard for domestic intellectual property 
laws of WTO members.c 
Basic Principle(s)  Art. 8 TRIPS: Members’ rights to adopt TRIPS Agreement-consistent 
measures to protect, inter alia, not only public health and nutrition 
but also the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their 
socio-economic and technological development.  
Relevance  TRIPS strengthens the position of developers of climate-friendly 
technologies, but also demands a better dissemination via technology 
transfer. The role of the TRIPS Agreement is still not settled, given an 
ongoing debate on what constitutes technology transfer.d 
a See WTO, Environmental Services – Overview of Classification Issues, Informal Note by the Secretariat, JOB/SERV/84t 
(31 August 2011); Joachim Monkelbaan, Trade in Sustainable Energy Services (Geneva: ICTSD, 2013), 7–8, 
http://www.ictsd.org/downloads/2013/10/trade-in-sustainble-energy-services.pdf (accessed 8 December 2017). 
b See Article 2.1 TRIMs agreement. See WTO website: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/invest_e/ 
invest_info_e.htm (accessed 8 December 2017); David A. Ganz and Padideh Ala’i, “Climate Change Innova-
tion, Products and Services under the GATT/WTO System”, in Research Handbook on Intellectual Property and 
Climate Change, ed. Joshua D. Sarnoff (Cheltenham, UK, and Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2016), 290. 
c Yu, “Intellectual Property Enforcement and Global Climate Change” (see note 56). 
d Ibid. 
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Table 
WTO agreements that are relevant for national climate policy action (cont.) 
TBT 
Agreement on Technical 
Barriers to Trade 
Scope of agreement and purpose: 
Focus on non-discrimination rules, more specific than GATT 
provisions; aims at creating a predictable trading environment. 
Approach  Establishes features specific to the preparation and application of 
regulatory measures that affect the trade in goods. If a measure sets 
out procedures that require the fulfilment of technical regulations or 
standards (testing, inspections, and certification), then this falls under 
conformity assessment procedures under the TBT Agreement.e 
Basic Principle(s)  Non-discrimination following Art. III GATT. 
Relevance  Climate-related rules, guidelines, or characteristics of products or 
related production methods with which compliance is voluntary, are 
standards under the TBT Agreement. Mandatory climate regulations are 
technical regulations. TBT committee is a very active forum, in which 
WTO members exchange details about their national policies on 
standards, e.g. efficiency standards. 
SCM 
Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures 
Scope of agreement and purpose: 
Adds precision to Art. XVI GATT. Limiting use of subsidies by WTO 
members. 
Approach  Defines subsidies and disciplines on countervailing duties. 
Basic Principle(s)  Art. XVI GATT: Benefit needs to be conferred through any of the 
transfer options listed, categorisation of subsidies: prohibited or 
actionable. 
Relevance  Climate policies may include subsidies for low-carbon energy; 
subsidies provided to fossil fuels lead to greenhouse gas emissions. 
Anti-Dumping Agreement Scope of agreement and purpose: 
Clarification and expansion of Art. VI GATT for the WTO members. 
Approach  WTO member has to submit proof that dumping is taking place, 
calculate the extent of dumping and show that the dumping is 
causing injury or threatening to do so. Allows for charging extra 
import duties on the particular product from the particular exporting 
country to bring its price closer to the “normal value”, or to remove 
the injury to domestic industry in the importing country.f 
Basic Principle(s)  Members can act against dumping where there is genuine 
(“material”) injury to the competing domestic industry. 
Relevance  Anti-dumping actions are applied to a number of renewable energy 
products, in particular solar cells and panels.g 
e WTO, Technical Barriers to Trade, The WTO Agreement Series (Geneva: WTO, 2014), 13. 
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/tbttotrade_e.pdf (accessed 8 December 2017). 
f See WTO website: https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm8_e.htm (accessed 
8 December 2017). 
g The anti-dumping claims by the EU in 2013 against China were valid according to the WTO DSB, and pro-
tection of EU producers was allowed for a two-year-period; European Commission, The European Union’s 
Measures against Dumped and Subsidised Imports of Solar Panels from China (2016), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/ do-
clib/docs/2015/july/tradoc_153587.pdf (accessed 8 December 2017). 
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Japan (2010) and the EU (2011) initiated cases 
against the province of Ontario’s feed-in tariff (FIT) 
programme, which includes LCRs. The Japanese claim 
was that the programme’s LCRs discriminated against 
foreign renewable energy products, placing Canada 
in violation of the national treatment requirements of 
the GATT and the TRIMs Agreement, and constituting 
a prohibited subsidy under the SCM Agreement (see 
Table). Canada argued that the measure was not 
subject to the WTO agreements cited because its FIT 
was a form of government procurement, to which 
the national treatment obligation did not apply.82 
The WTO panels acknowledged most of the claims 
by Japan and the EU, but they were divided on the 
subsidy issue. Canada appealed the decisions. The 
Appellate Body in May 2013 held that Ontario’s FIT 
programme violated the national treatment obliga-
tion under the GATT and the TRIMs Agreement, 
though it disagreed on the subsidy determination. 
As a result, Canada had to bring its programmes into 
compliance, which it did by mid-2014. 
Another example is from 2012, when China re-
quested WTO consultations with the EU, Greece, and 
Italy on various feed-in tariff programmes in support 
of solar energy generation that allegedly contained 
LCRs. China claimed that the measures were incon-
sistent with the GATT as well as the SCM and TRIMs 
agreements (see Table). The EU accepted the request 
for consultations,83 which are still pending. 
Moreover, the EU faces four WTO disputes around 
the biodiesel anti-dumping duties it imposed, three 
of them filed by Argentina and one by Indonesia.84 The 
main aspects of these four cases are the favouring of 
biodiesels produced in the EU by Spain; measures on 
importing and marketing of biodiesel; the support 
of the biodiesel industry in Belgium, France, Italy, 
Poland, and Spain; and anti-dumping measures within 
the EU. The dispute on the favouring of biodiesels 
 
82 Joanna I. Lewis, “The Rise of Renewable Energy Protection-
ism: Emerging Trade Conflicts and Implications for Low Car-
bon Development”, Global Environmental Politics 14, no. 4 (2014): 
10–35. 
83 European Commission, General Overview of Active WTO Dis-
pute Settlement Cases Involving the EU As Complainant or Defendant 
and of Active Cases under the Trade Barriers Regulation (2013), http:// 
trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2007/may/tradoc_134652.pdf. 
84 Notably, Argentina and Indonesia together make up 90 
per cent of the EU’s biodiesel imports and capture more than 
one-fifth of the bloc’s market share; ICTSD, “WTO Panel to 
Examine EU Duties on Argentine Biodiesel”, BIORES 18, no. 15 
(2014), http://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges/news/wto-
panel-to-examine-eu-duties-on-argentine-biodiesel. 
produced in the EU by Spain was put on hold after 
Spain announced it would modify the biofuel rule.85 
The other disputes on biodiesel are still pending. 
Also, the US has actively called on the WTO system 
for rulings on national energy policy approaches. The 
US has accused China of supporting renewables equip-
ment in a trade-distorting way on several occasions 
and brought this to WTO dispute settlement bodies in 
2010. The consultations that followed led to a revoca-
tion of the subsidy in 2011 by China.86 Seemingly in 
retaliation, China complained about US investigations 
into China’s pricing practices for solar panels and 
wind towers.87 In July 2014, a WTO panel found the 
practices of the US on the calculations of CVDs to be in 
violation of certain provisions of the SCM Agreement. 
The panel recommended that the US government bring 
its measures into conformity. Because both China and 
the US filed appeals on certain legal questions, the 
Appellate Body had to take up the case. Its report was 
adopted, with recommendations being made to bring 
the US measure(s) into conformity with WTO law. 
Indian energy policy has also been challenged by 
the US. The US filed a complaint against Indian LCR 
provisions pertaining to solar cells and/or modules.88 
A WTO panel was established in May 2014, and for 
several months India tried through bilaterally meas-
ures to persuade the US to withdraw the case. In its 
report on the matter, released in February 2016, the 
panel found that the LCRs introduced as part of the 
Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission (JNNSM) 
constituted trade-related investment measures, thus 
 
85 ICTSD, “EU, Argentina File Appeals in Biodiesel WTO Dis-
pute”, BRIDGES 20, no. 20 (2 June 2016), http://www.ictsd.org/ 
bridges-news/bridges/news/eu-argentina-file-appeals-in-
biodiesel-wto-dispute. 
86 ICTSD, “US Proclaims Victory in Wind Power Case; China 
Ends Challenged Subsidies”, BRIDGES 15, no. 25 (2011), http:// 
www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges/news/us-proclaims-
victory-in-wind-power-case-china-ends-challenged-subsidies 
(accessed 8 December 2017). 
87 ICTSD, “US Probe into China, Vietnam Wind Tower Im-
ports Moves Forward”, BRIDGES 16, no. 6 (2012), http://www. 
ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges/news/us-probe-into-china-
vietnam-wind-tower-imports-moves-forward (accessed 8 De-
cember 2017). 
88 The Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission (JNNSM) 
started in January 2010, as one of the eight national missions 
identified in India’s National Action Plan on Climate Change 
2008, aiming at generating 100,000 megawatts of grid-con-
nected solar power capacity by 2022. See Government of In-
dia, Resolution: Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission, 11 Janu-
ary 2010, http://www.mnre.gov.in/solar-mission/jnnsm/ 
resolution-2/ (accessed 8 December 2017). 
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violating the national treatment obligation under the 
TRIMs Agreement and the GATT.89 The panel empha-
sised that the legitimacy of the policy objectives pur-
sued through the JNNSM was not under dispute.90 In 
April 2016, India appealed the case on certain legal 
aspects of the panel’s findings. On 16 September 2016, 
the Appellate Body ruled against India.91 Meanwhile, 
India has lodged another WTO challenge against 
alleged LCRs and subsidies being imposed by eight 
US states.92 
Climate-related Provisions in 
Regional Trade Agreements 
In RTAs, three types of environmental and climate pro-
visions exist.93 A first type are general environmental 
provisions that do not mention climate change but 
are applicable nevertheless. They include references to 
the environment, references to principles (notably the 
principle of common but differentiated responsibili-
ties), and provisions stipulating that parties need to 
ensure a high level of environmental protection or 
that parties must uphold, improve, and enforce en-
vironmental laws. 
In addition, to the extent that references to multi-
lateral environmental agreements are not specified, 
any reference that specifies the relationship between 
an RTA and such agreements could be seen to include 
 
89 ICTSD, “India Lodges WTO Appeal in US Solar Cells Dis-
pute”, BIORES 20, no. 15 (2016), http://www.ictsd.org/bridges-
news/bridges/news/india-lodges-wto-appeal-in-us-solar-cells-
dispute (accessed 8 December 2017). 
90 ICTSD, “WTO Decision on Local Content Requirements 
Will Not Affect India Solar Ambitions, Officials Say”, BIORES 
20, no. 15 (2016), http://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges/ 
news/wto-decision-on-local-content-requirements-will-not-
affect-india-solar (accessed 8 December 2017). 
91 WTO DS456, India – Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells 
and Solar Modules (Geneva: WTO, 2016), https://www.wto.org/ 
english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds456_e.htm#bkmk456abr 
(accessed 8 December 2017). 
92 WTO DS510, United States – Certain Measures Relating to the 
Renewable Energy Sector (Geneva: WTO, 2016), see https://www. 
wto.org/english/news_e/news16_e/ds510rfc_12sep16_e.htm 
(accessed 8 December 2017). 
93 Markus W. Gehring, Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger, 
Fabiano de Andrade Correa et al., Climate Change and Sustain-
able Energy Measures in Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs), Issue 
Paper 3 (Geneva: ICTSD, August 2013), http://www.ictsd.org/ 
downloads/2013/08/climate-change-and-sustainable-energy-
measures-in-regional-trade-agreements-rtas.pdf (accessed 
8 December 2017). 
also the climate treaties (UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol, Paris 
Agreement). The general environmental provisions 
also include specifications of the exception of Article 
XX GATT, with some RTAs extending the exception to 
other issue areas, such as technical barriers to trade. 
The EU and Singapore created recent examples for a 
second type of environmental and climate provisions. 
The EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement94 explicitly 
seeks to facilitate trade in climate-friendly goods and 
services. In addition, a separate chapter of the agree-
ment is dedicated to non-tariff barriers to trade and 
investment in renewable energy generation, in which 
it is specified that parties will “refrain from adopting 
measures providing for LCRs or any other offset affect-
ing the other Party’s products, service suppliers, inves-
tors or investments” (Article 7.4[a]). The same agree-
ment also includes a provision on reducing trade 
distortions resulting from fossil fuel subsidies, stating 
that “the Parties share the goal of progressively reduc-
ing subsidies for fossil fuels” (Article 13.11.3). 
A third type of provision found in many different 
RTAs is aimed at deepening cooperation on climate 
change between the parties to the agreement, includ-
ing general commitments to enhance climate policy 
efforts and reaffirmations of existing commitments 
under the climate treaties. Also, provisions exist on a 
range of specific issues, including adaptation, carbon 
markets, technologies, forests, and agriculture. De-
pending on the mandate – and, most importantly, 
budget allocations of the parties involved – such pro-
visions can form the basis for subsequent technical 
cooperation, information exchange, and capacity 
building, and could even go beyond the commitments 
under the UNFCCC.95 
 
 
 
94 See the EU Commission website for the text of the EU-
Singapore Agreement: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/ 
index.cfm?id=961 (accessed 8 December 2017). 
95 As for instance in Article 19.8.2 of the Korea-Peru Free 
Trade Agreement, which includes provisions on energy effi-
ciency, renewable energy, technologies of carbon dioxide 
capture, innovative environmental technologies, food secu-
rity, conservation of biological diversity, and measures 
for evaluating the vulnerability and adaptation to climate 
change; see http://www.fta.go.kr/webmodule/_PSD_FTA/pe/1/ 
eng.pdf. 
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Ways forward for the EU to Make the Trade Regime 
Supportive for Climate Action 
 
The EU is a key player in international trade negotia-
tions. Its efforts to negotiate an Environmental Goods 
Agreement as a plurilateral treaty under the WTO tes-
tify that the EU wants to promote trade also in un-
precedented ways. When it comes to supporting inter-
national climate action through trade, there are 
several steps that can be taken. International scholars 
have proposed legal reforms and procedural improve-
ments for reducing conflicts between trade and climate 
policy measures. The proposed options vary regarding 
their implementation potential. In particular, the 
prospects for a WTO reform seem bleak. 
Nevertheless, we identify the reform options the EU 
and other countries could look for in the long term, 
medium term and short term; our evaluation is guided 
by the question of whether, and how, more certainty 
for policy-making can be created. As a mid-term strat-
egy, we suggest, in particular, focussing on the role of 
regional deals for bringing forward a supportive role 
of trade for climate protection. Not least, promoting 
climate protection could be an ingredient for building 
up new levels of public support for trade negotiations. 
The Long-term Vision: 
Improving Legal Guidance 
One argument in favour of reforming WTO rules is 
that the case-by-case nature of WTO disputes does not 
provide sufficient structural legal guidance for the 
implementation of NDCs under the Paris Agreement. 
It instead leaves the settlement of climate-related dis-
putes to a body that is obviously guided first and fore-
most by the rules of the multilateral trading system.96 
Legal guidance for clarifying the relationship between 
WTO rules and climate policy measures would need 
 
96 See James Bacchus, Global Rules for Mutually Supportive and 
Reinforcing Trade and Climate Regimes (E15 Expert Group on 
Measures to Address Climate Change and the Trade System, 
2016), 13–14, http://www3.weforum.org/docs/E15/WEF_ 
Climate_Change_POP.pdf (accessed 8 December 2017); Tracey 
Epps and Andrew Green, Reconciling Trade and Climate. How the 
WTO Can Help Address Climate Change (Cheltenham, UK: Edward 
Elgar, 2010), 260–65. 
strong support from key WTO member countries.97 
If the demand for legal guidance increases, there are 
several ways forward. 
Amendment 
A first option is to amend relevant WTO agreements 
to change the relevant trade rules. Suggestions in this 
regard include amending Article XX GATT to explicitly 
accommodate climate change measures or measures 
taken pursuant to multilateral environmental agree-
ments, or amending the SCM Agreement to provide 
space for green subsidies.98 From a legal perspective, 
an ambitious reform through amendments or new rule 
creation would be attractive. It would increase the 
legal certainty and normative coherence across regimes 
and offer a solution for the longer term.99 Yet, it is not 
clear what the content of such rules could be for serv-
ing both climate and trade aims. Moreover, negotia-
tions will be very challenging, as at least a two-thirds 
majority of members need to agree, and in some cases 
even all members (Article X of the Agreement Estab-
lishing the WTO). Amendments may also lead to a 
complex legal situation if a sufficient number – but 
not all – of the WTO members accept it. Finally, amend-
ments have hardly been used in WTO practice so 
far.100 
 
97 Tamiotti, “The Legal Interface between Carbon Border 
Measures and Trade Rules” (see note 69), 1207. 
98 International Bar Association, Achieving Justice and Human 
Rights in an Era of Climate Change Disruption (London: Bar, 2014), 
166–67, http://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx? 
DocumentUid=0F8CEE12-EE56-4452-BF43-CFCAB196CC04 
(accessed 8 December 2017). 
99 Harro van Asselt, Francesco Sindico, and Michael A. 
Mehling, “Global Climate Change and the Fragmentation of 
International Law”, Law & Policy 30, no. 4 (2008): 423–49 (440). 
100 “The only amendment decision in the WTO was passed 
in 2005, which modified the TRIPS Agreement. In ten years, 
the decision has been accepted in only 53 local legislatures 
of the total 160 WTO Members.” Beatriz Leycegui and Imanol 
Ramirez, Addressing Climate Change: A WTO Exception to Incorpo-
rate Climate Clubs (E15 Expert Group on Measures to Address 
Climate Change and the Trade System, 2015), 3. 
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Waiver 
A second option is to waive specific WTO obligations 
for a limited time. Waivers, which can be adopted if 
there are “exceptional circumstances” (Article IX.3 of 
the Agreement Establishing the WTO), require a three-
fourths majority, although consensus has remained 
the rule in practice.101 A WTO member could argue 
that achieving climate policy objectives constitutes 
“exceptional circumstances”. A key question to be 
clarified here is how to define the scope, that is, what 
are the actual “climate measures”.102 
The time-limited nature of waivers suggests that a 
waiver will not create long-term certainty, but never-
theless this might render it more appealing than a 
permanent amendment. Also, a waiver restricts the 
WTO jurisdiction in favour of “other international 
legal regimes which may have greater competence 
and legitimacy than the WTO to deal with certain is-
sues”,103 and which actually have a legal mandate that 
affects trade.104 If waivers were used repeatedly, for 
example when implementing the NDCs under the 
Paris Agreement, this could also create a longer-term 
effect for the consideration of climate policy issues 
under the WTO. Again, the limitations to introducing 
a waiver are set by the political interests in doing so.105 
Authoritative Interpretation 
A third option would be to adopt an authoritative inter-
pretation of certain provisions in the WTO agreements 
by a three-fourths majority, although also here con-
sensus would be the rule in practice.106 Suggestions 
 
101 Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Steve Charnovitz, and Jisun Kim, 
Global Warming and the World Trading System (Washington, D.C.: 
Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2009), 97; 
Isabel Feichtner, “The Waiver Power of the WTO: Opening the 
WTO for Political Debate on the Reconciliation of Competing 
Interests”, European Journal of International Law 20, no. 3 (2009): 
615–45 (619). 
102 Epps, Green, Reconciling Trade and Climate (see note 96), 
255–56. 
103 Feichtner, “The Waiver Power of the WTO” (see note 101), 
645. 
104 Ibid., 618. 
105 James Bacchus, The Case for a WTO Climate Waiver, Special 
Report (Waterloo, Ontario: Center for International Govern-
ance Innovation, 2017), https://www.cigionline.org/sites/ 
default/files/documents/NEWEST%20Climate%20Waiver%20-
%20Bacchus.pdf (accessed 8 December 2017). 
106 Claus-Dieter Ehlermann and Lothar Ehring, “The Authori-
tative Interpretation under Article IX:2 of the Agreement 
include that climate measures taken pursuant to the 
Paris Agreement are measures within the scope of 
Article XX GATT and Article XIV GATS. 
On the one hand, the introduction of an authorita-
tive interpretation of Article XX GATT would document 
consensus among WTO members on the importance 
of climate-related policies under the WTO regime. 
It would mainly affirm existing opinio juris around 
Article XX GATT, but by being explicit, it could deter 
judicial action by opponents to specific climate 
action.107 On the other hand, a broad authoritative 
interpretation could give carte blanche for the protec-
tionist application of trade policy tools. Although an 
authoritative interpretation cannot make non-trade 
rules directly applicable in a trade dispute, it could 
help tilt the balance towards a climate-friendly inter-
pretation of certain provisions of the WTO agreements. 
Peace Clause 
Another way to give some leeway for WTO members’ 
climate policies would be a time-limited peace clause 
for taking action against trade-related climate meas-
ures.108 It could commit WTO members to wait before 
challenging national climate measures, or refrain 
from using countermeasures that restrict trade or 
otherwise have trade effects in WTO dispute settle-
ments.109 A comparable clause had been in effect for 
nine years with respect to agricultural subsidies. Huf-
bauer et al. (2009) suggest focussing on climate-related 
subsidies, in particular.110 As with waivers, the chal-
lenge is to get the scope right by singling out those 
measures that legitimately seek to implement the 
Paris Agreement or otherwise promote climate goals. 
If this issue were solved, a peace clause would buy 
time that could be used for constructive dialogue 
 
Establishing the World Trade Organization: Current Law, 
Practice and Possible Improvements”, Journal of International 
Economic Law 8, no. 4 (2005): 803–24 (806). 
107 Interpretations on Article XX can be found in WTO DS2, 
US – United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional 
Gasoline (1996), see https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/ 
dispu_e/cases_e/ds2_e.htm (accessed 8 December 2017). 
108 Hufbauer, Charnovitz, and Kim, Global Warming and the 
World Trading System (see note 101); cf. Bacchus, Global Rules 
for Mutually Supportive and Reinforcing Trade and Climate Regimes 
(see note 96). 
109 Bacchus, Global Rules for Mutually Supportive and Reinforcing 
Trade and Climate Regimes (see note 96), 14. 
110 Hufbauer, Charnovitz, and Kim, Global Warming and the 
World Trading System (see note 101), 109–10. 
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rather than further confrontations over specific is-
sues.111 An ill-formulated peace clause, however, could 
potentially offer countries a carte blanche, and thus cre-
ate a perverse incentive for introducing protectionist 
or otherwise trade-restrictive climate policy measures. 
A peace clause ultimately requires an amendment of 
the relevant WTO agreements, and it is therefore sub-
ject to the same limitations as other amendments. 
Changing the Scope of the 
WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism 
Proposals exist to expand the jurisdiction of the WTO 
dispute settlement body to non-trade rules and prin-
ciples, which could give climate obligations further 
weight as compared to free trade disciplines in WTO 
judicial decision-making. Again, this would need 
broad support from WTO members. A more feasible 
proposal would be to ensure that the composition of 
WTO panels and the AB as such reflect the necessary 
technical expertise to cover climate-related issues (e.g. 
supporting the determination of whether a certain 
policy measure effectively contributes to greenhouse 
gas emission reductions). 
A Plurilateral Trade and Climate Agreement 
A plurilateral trade and climate code to deal with a 
range of aspects on the climate-and-trade interface 
is also among the proposals.112 This code could be 
adopted as a plurilateral agreement under Annex 4 
of the WTO Agreement (similar to, for example, the 
Government Procurement Agreement) and does not 
require consensus. Similarly, the International Center 
for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) sug-
gests a “Sustainable Energy Trade Agreement” that 
covers not only the liberalisation of trade in climate-
friendly goods and services, but also non-tariff barriers 
such as technical standards.113 A plurilateral agree-
 
111 Hufbauer, Charnovitz, and Kim, Global Warming and the 
World Trading System (see note 101), 103–10, refer to the con-
tested issue of BCA. Cf. Epps, Green, Reconciling Trade and 
Climate (see note 96), 254; Bacchus, Global Rules for Mutually Sup-
portive and Reinforcing Trade and Climate Regimes (see note 96), 17. 
112 Hufbauer, Charnovitz, and Kim, Global Warming and the 
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113 ICTSD, Fostering Low Carbon Growth: The Case for a Sustainable 
Energy Trade Agreement (Geneva: ICTSD, 2011), http://www. 
ictsd.org/downloads/2011/12/fostering-low-carbon-growth-the-
ment would not create rights or obligations for other 
WTO members, but its inclusion in Annex 4 does 
require consensus, as enforcement of the agreement 
would be allowed through the WTO’s dispute settle-
ment mechanism. The benefits of such an agreement 
would normally accrue to all WTO members, to the 
extent that it would cover subjects within the scope 
of the MFN obligations of WTO agreements.114 The 
limited-membership arrangement would be open to 
participation by further WTO members and could 
thus expand its membership over time. Although the 
negotiations seem easier due to the lower number of 
parties, the approval of a plurilateral agreement as an 
additional Annex 4 agreement requires the agreement 
of all WTO members. 
A Medium-term Strategy: 
Promoting Climate Policies through RTAs 
Two benefits could result from RTAs. First, they could 
serve as role models for the multilateral system by 
testing innovative rules and procedures and by includ-
ing specific topics that are difficult to negotiate multi-
laterally. Secondly, by extending membership gradually 
through openness, the benefits of an RTA could in-
crease and pave the way for more global cooperation 
in a time when interest in global talks is low. With 
the negotiations on TTIP, there was an opportunity 
to facilitate trade in climate-friendly technologies be-
tween the US and the EU, and furthermore to ensure 
regulatory coherence, including aligning standards.115 
Bilateral agreements with small countries, such as the 
EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, do not offer this 
leverage. Nevertheless, smaller agreements can always 
inject new ideas into the debate. 
During the last decades, EU trade policy with third 
parties moved from tariff reductions to reducing non-
tariff barriers and including investment issues. The 
complexity of the deals has been increasing. Before 
CETA and TTIP, which both cover an array of issues 
beyond trade in goods, the EU set up separate deals 
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with specific issues addressing the regulatory environ-
ments of the trade partner countries, with the aim of 
achieving harmonisation (e.g. with Chile on technical 
issues) or mutual acceptance of equivalent standards 
(e.g. with Canada).116 These issues are included in the 
latest mega-regionals. CETA Chapter 21, for example, 
creates a “Regulatory Cooperation Forum” in which 
administrative issues and regulatory approaches are 
discussed on a regular basis.117 
The EU could thus consider engaging in a newly 
framed trade-and-climate strategy – with the aim of 
supporting the Paris Agreement – by negotiating with 
its key partner countries about trade and investment 
liberalisation. The list of issues could be extended to 
strengthening environmental laws and enforcement, 
and further promoting collaboration on climate-
related issues, such as fossil fuel subsidy reform. In 
times when links to the US are weakening, ties with 
Canada and Latin America could be intensified. An-
other key partner is China. Last, but not least, as India 
is a very important player for protecting the global 
climate, EU-India cooperation should focus on renew-
able energy investment. 
Already 25 years ago, NAFTA demonstrated that 
environmental standards could become part of a trade 
deal. A large number of agreements followed with 
“green” clauses or wording that associated trade rules 
with environmental goals.118 
In light of the EU’s experience with RTAs such as 
CETA and TTIP – where the negotiation and ratifica-
tion processes were halted by protests from civil 
society and political interventions from Member 
States – the EU will need to rethink its trade strategy 
in general. A first attempt was made with the Euro-
pean Commission proposal “Trade for All” in 2015, 
which aims at promoting transparency, sustainable 
development, and human rights, thus reflecting the 
criticisms from civil society. The need for a new trade 
agenda is exacerbated by the transatlantic disruptions 
that have emerged since President Trump took office. 
In light of protectionism and the urgency of climate 
policy implementation under the Paris Agreement, 
the EU could leverage its role as a reliable climate 
 
116 Bettina Rudloff and Moritz Laurer, The EU As Global Trade 
and Investment Actor – The Times They Are Achangin, Working 
Paper Research Division EU/Europe (Berlin: Stiftung Wissen-
schaft und Politik, January 2017), 22–23. 
117 See CETA consolidated text, 173 ff., http://trade.ec. 
europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/september/tradoc_152806.pdf 
(accessed 8 December 2017). 
118 Berger et al., Towards “Greening” Trade? (see note 36). 
actor by increasing trade cooperation with key partner 
countries from the OECD as well as the emerging and 
developing countries. 
If the EU Member States can agree to develop RTAs 
in this direction, these deals hold the potential to fa-
cilitate multilateral agreement on climate–trade inter-
actions in the longer term. The extent to which this 
potential can be realised depends on the parties to 
the RTAs. The greater the market power of the parties 
introducing specific standards, the greater the likeli-
hood that such standards will be taken up elsewhere. 
Berger et al. (2017) find that asymmetry among the 
negotiating partners helped the industrialised coun-
tries to include environmental provisions and other 
complex issues in RTAs with emerging economies.119 
It is, however, a long way to go from the inclusion of 
standards in a greater number of RTAs to, ultimately, 
multilateralisation via the WTO.120 
In the Short-run: Bringing forward Specific 
Issues under the Paris Agreement 
Parties to the Paris Agreement will be negotiating the 
detailed implementation rules until the end of 2018. 
Trade-related aspects of the new climate regime will 
primarily be addressed in the improved forum on im-
pacts of the implementation of response measures.121 
For the EU it is important to embed the current im-
plementation of the Paris Agreement at home in the 
wider context of trade relations. 
Emissions Trading and Carbon Pricing 
The role of emissions trading under the Paris Agree-
ment is implicit in Article 6, although no details exist 
yet on the type of tradable units, their fungibility, nor 
on their accounting or environmental integrity. Until 
China has set up a fully-fledged ETS, the EU ETS rep-
resents the largest market for allowances globally. It 
has restricted access for credits from foreign offset 
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projects in the third phase (2013–2020) due to environ-
mental integrity concerns and, more generally, a col-
lapse in the EU ETS allowance price. Thus, the EU is a 
key negotiating party for implementing a new regu-
latory environment for international market-based 
approaches under Article 6. However, as long as there 
is little political interest in linking the EU ETS with 
other systems or increasing the demand for foreign 
allowances and credits, the provisions will remain a 
theoretical exercise – especially as long as the number 
of countries that would like to offer allowances in 
international markets outnumbers those of potential 
buyers by far.122 
In 2016, the EU started the process of legislative 
amendments for the post-2020 phase of its ETS in 
order to follow up on its NDC, achieving a legislative 
compromise in November 2017 that increases auction-
ing and tightens supply. These changes are aimed at 
achieving the EU NDC, which requires a 40 per cent 
emissions reduction by 2030 compared to 1990. For 
this to materialise, the EU ETS will have to decrease 
the emissions from the relevant industrial and power 
sectors by 43 per cent (compared to 2005) by 2030. 
Already in the third phase (2013–2020), the European 
Commission included free allocation as a means to 
ease the cost pressures for sectors that have competi-
tiveness concerns. This policy to prevent carbon leak-
age will continue after 2020.123 During the legislative 
process, the Environmental Committee of the Euro-
pean Parliament suggested applying border-adjust-
ment pricing in combination with auctioning for the 
cement sector to prevent carbon leakage and to in-
crease the incentives for this sector to decarbonise.124 
Although border carbon adjustment is a political 
minefield, in this specific case it would have increased 
the efficiency of EU climate policy, because it is a tool 
that is tailor-made.125 It is well documented that the 
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123 See European Commission, Climate Action, Emissions 
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ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/revision_en (accessed 8 De-
cember 2017). 
124 See European Parliament, Report on the Proposal for a Direc-
tive of the European Parliament and of the Council Amending Directive 
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carbon Investments, A8-0003/2017, Amendment 12, 15–16, 
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(accessed 8 December 2017). 
125 Michael Mehling, Harro van Asselt, Kasturi Das et al, 
Designing Border Carbon Adjustments for Enhanced Cli-
cement sector imported clinker as a reaction to the EU 
ETS and sold the free allowances. Little to no incentive 
existed to innovate for low-carbon alternatives.126 
The idea of climate policy coalitions (often called 
“clubs”) is also included in Article 6 PA. Such a constel-
lation could include a preferential deal on market 
access for climate-friendly technologies or an exten-
sion of carbon-pricing cooperation, which discrimi-
nates against goods and services of third parties.127 
This approach, which ultimately would aim at pro-
gress for the Paris Agreement by putting pressure on 
non-cooperative parties, is difficult to justify under 
the current WTO regime (as discussed in Section “Iden-
tifying the Upcoming Issues”, p. 15). 
Nevertheless, the EU could consider cooperating 
more closely along these lines with other countries on 
climate policy-making in light of non-cooperative US 
climate policy strategy. 
For fossil fuel subsidies, the EU, as an important 
first step, could promote to enhance the transparency 
of such subsidies, for instance by adopting a new 
notification template that provides further details on 
subsidies in a standardised fashion128 and allows non-
governmental organisations to report on the level of 
non-actionable subsidies.129 Neither of these options 
would require changes in the WTO’s legal frame-
work.130 At present, it seems quite unlikely that WTO 
members are willing to renegotiate the subsidies 
regime to take into account the climate impacts of 
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fossil fuel subsidies, for example by qualifying them as 
either “prohibited” or “actionable”.131 
Technology Transfer and Intellectual 
Property Rights 
The European Commission takes a tough stance on 
lowering IPR protection, as it regards IPR as a crucial 
factor in incentivising investment in green technol-
ogies and also when bringing climate-friendly tech-
nologies to third countries. Even though it regards 
concessions as difficult and thinks they should be 
limited to like-minded countries,132 reconsidering this 
stance will be important for deploying climate-friendly 
technologies faster in developing countries – not least 
to help them implement their NDCs. It can be antici-
pated that the IPR issues will not be resolved in 2018, 
as any solution at the UN level needs to incorporate 
the concerns of both developing and developed coun-
tries. The underlying conflicts about IPRs, however, 
block solutions to specific aspects of the protection of 
climate technology and know-how. 
Aviation and Maritime Transport 
The EU decision on the ETS in the fourth phase in-
cludes a placeholder recital in the text requiring 
action to regulate shipping emissions under the EU 
ETS from 2023 onward should the UN’s IMO fail to 
take adequate global action by then. This step was 
announced together with action on aviation.133 The 
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shipping industry rejects such unilateral legislation 
and warned the EU not to endanger the multilateral 
process under the IMO.134 The IMO’s roadmap foresees 
that any commitment shall be postponed until 2023.135 
With such an inclusion of emissions that do not stem 
from EU territory the ETS reform establishes a case 
where imports are included in the ETS.136 It can be ex-
pected that this will trigger another conflict about the 
legitimacy of such measures under WTO law, contrib-
uting to the debate about the need for mid- to long-
term legal guidance. 
Improving the Institutional Setting 
In the current phase of negotiations about a Paris 
Agreement rulebook and more ambitions until 2020 
(Talanoa Dialogue), the EU – and also other countries 
promoting the Paris Agreement - should use existing 
forums to a greater extent to interact with their trade 
partners on the trade-related implications of climate 
policy-making. This would limit the potential for 
political conflicts around trade and climate as well 
as provide better information among the institutions 
involved in such disputes. There is already informal 
interaction between the UNFCCC Secretariat and the 
WTO members and institutions (in particular, the CTE). 
A next step in that direction could include working to-
wards an upgrading of the Trade Policy Review Mecha-
nism and the CTE of the WTO as well as the Subsidiary 
on Body Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) 
of the UNFCCC. The Trade Policy Review Mechanism 
could be strengthened to include a compulsory assess-
ment of the impact of relevant domestic measures on 
emissions and efforts to address climate change.137 
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In addition, decision-making and administrative 
bodies in both the trade and climate regimes could 
seek to actively liaise in a systematic way, thereby 
strengthening their knowledge base and creating a 
better understanding of the implications of trade–
climate interactions for the respective objectives, prin-
ciples, and legal obligations in each regime. For such a 
move, the EU would need to give an example by align-
ing its climate policy and negotiation agenda with 
its trade agenda. The mandate of the CTE could be ex-
plicitly extended to include climate change policy, 
turning it into a Committee on Trade, Environment 
and Climate Change. If this proves to be a feasible 
option, it could include representatives from WTO 
members with distinct knowledge of UNFCCC issues. 
Increasing Transparency through 
Notification and Review 
Enhanced transparency is key for building trust 
between developing, emerging, and industrial coun-
tries when implementing the Paris Agreement. In this 
respect, the EU could act once more as a role model by 
promoting transparency also for trade-related aspects 
of EU climate actions. Information about trade-related 
climate measures could be enhanced through notifi-
cation of such measures in a formal manner, for ex-
ample by including in future NDC submissions to the 
UNFCCC a section that highlights trade-related aspects 
of specific national climate actions. Another option 
that could provide information, also for the WTO com-
mittees, would be to set up an information hub at the 
UNFCCC Secretariat through the creation of a central 
registry. Parties to the UNFCCC could log and record 
trade-related climate measures, or even include such 
information in the transparency template guiding 
countries in their mandatory reporting under the 
Paris Agreement. The notification of trade-related 
climate measures could be linked to the work pro-
gramme of the UNFCCC forum on the impacts of the 
implementation of response measures. Addressing 
trade issues in the forum will undoubtedly be chal-
lenging – as it has been in the past – but the more 
technical turn of the forum’s new work programme 
may offer space for less-politicised discussions. 
For specific issues, such as fossil fuel subsidies and 
policies to promote renewable energy, the notification 
to the SCM Committee would help increase transpar-
ency on such measures. For issues that touch upon the 
legality of the GATS, the evaluation of the classifica-
tion of environmental services in the WTO Committee 
on Trade in Services could be undertaken. This could 
aim at extending the WTO services classifications, 
with a view to coordinating negotiations on trade in 
environmental goods with negotiations on related 
services, ultimately opening the door for greater legal 
certainty on climate-related services under the GATS. 
Abbreviations 
SWP Berlin 
Mobilising Trade Policy for Climate Action under the Paris Agreement 
Options for the European Union 
February 2018 
 
 
34 
Abbreviations 
AB Appellate Body 
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
BCA border carbon adjustment 
CDM Clean Development Mechanism 
CETA Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement 
CMA Conference of the Parties serving as the 
Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement 
CORSIA Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for 
International Aviation 
CRS Congressional Research Service 
CTE Committee on Trade and Environment 
CTEI Centre for Trade and Economic Integration 
CVD countervailing duty 
DSB dispute settlement body (WTO) 
DSU dispute settlement understanding (WTO) 
EDF Environmental Defense Fund 
EFTA European Free Trade Association 
EGA Environmental Goods Agreement 
ETS emissions trading system 
EU European Union 
FIT feed-in tariff 
GATS General Agreement on Trade in Services 
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization 
ICTSD International Center for Trade and Sustainable 
Development 
IETA International Emissions Trading Association 
IISD International Institute for Sustainable Development 
IMO International Maritime Organization 
INDC intended nationally determined contribution 
IPR intellectual property right 
JI Joint Implementation 
JNNSM Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission 
LCR local content requirement 
MERCOSUR Mercado Común del Sur 
MFN most-favoured nation 
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement 
NDC nationally determined contribution 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development 
PA Paris Agreement 
PPM processes and production method 
RCEP Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership 
RTA regional trade agreement 
SBSTA Subsidiary on Body Scientific and 
Technological Advice 
SCM subsidies and countervailing measures 
TBT technical barriers to trade 
TPP Trans-Pacific Partnership 
TRIMs Trade-Related Investment Measures 
TRIPS Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
TTIP Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change 
US United States 
WTO World Trade Organization 
